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   THE DUTY OF RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION AND THE PROBLEM 
OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Charles F. Sabel

 and William H. Simon

 
 
 Many contemporary civil rights claims arise from institutional activity 
that, while troubling, is neither malicious nor egregiously reckless.  When law-
makers find themselves unable to produce substantive rules for such activity, they 
often turn to regulating the actors’ exercise of discretion.  The consequence is an 
emerging duty of responsible administration that requires managers to actively 
assess the effects of their conduct on civil rights values and to make reasonable 
efforts to mitigate harm to protected groups.  This doctrinal evolution partially but 
imperfectly converges with an increasing emphasis in public administration on the 
need to reassess routines in the light of changing circumstances.  We illustrate the 
doctrinal and administrative changes with a study of policing.  We discuss court-
supervised reforms in New York and Cincinnati as examples of contrasting 
trajectories that these developments can take.  Both initiatives are better 
understood in terms of an implicit duty of responsible administration than as an 
expression of any particular substantive right.  However, the Cincinnati 
intervention reaches more deeply into core administrative practices and indeed 
mandates a particular crime control strategy – Problem-Oriented Policing. As 
such, it typifies a more ambitious type of structural civil-rights intervention that 
parallels comprehensive civil-rights initiatives in other areas. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
 Public officials have a duty of responsible administration that entails 
reflective and articulate elaboration of the policies and principles that 
govern their work, monitoring the activities of peers and subordinates to 
induce compliance with these policies and principles, and frequent re-
assessment of the policies and principles in the light of experience and 
evidence.   
 The “duty of responsible administration” is our name for some 
converging trends in constitutional law, common law, and statutes.  The 
term usefully expresses and summarizes developments across a range of 
fields.  It resonates with interpretations of the constitutional due process or 
“take care” clauses that entail obligations of general proactive 
administration.
1
  However, the most important recent authority for the duty 
arises from recent efforts to elaborate provisions of substantive civil rights 
law.  Where courts or legislatures cannot mandate specific substantive 
directives, they often turn to regulation of the ways in which officials give 
content to their discretion. Recurring procedural themes in the elaboration 
of various substantive doctrines suggest a set of implicit over-arching 
norms.  In a reversal of a process noted by Henry Maine, procedure has 
been secreted in the interstices of substance.
2
 
 At the same time that doctrine is becoming more procedural, 
administrative processes are evolving.  Agencies have been moving away 
from bureaucratic forms of administration.  Bureaucracy, as understood in 
mid-20
th
 century America, was a balance of stable, hierarchically-
promulgated rules and lightly supervised discretion.  Yet, this kind of 
organization no longer seems appropriate for many contemporary problems.  
Addressing current problems requires both more flexibility than rules 
permit and more transparency than discretion typically affords.  Efficacy 
depends on frontline initiative but also demands that such initiative be 
reflective and accountable.  Thus, administration is drawn to post-
                                                 
1
  Jerry Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Theoretical and Litigation 
Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social 
Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 772 (1974) (suggesting that “due process” entails 
general proactive administrative duties); Gillian Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to 
Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. 1836, 1875-86 (2105) (considering the “take care” clause of 
Article II as a source of a duty to supervise subordinate officials). 
2
  Henry Sumner Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom 389 (1883) (“in the 
infancy of Courts of Justice … substantive law has at first the look of being gradually 
secreted in the interstices of procedure”). 
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bureaucratic forms of organization that emphasize provisional and easily 
revised plans, monitoring designed to induce learning as well as 
compliance, and systematic re-assessment on the basis of experience within 
the agency and in comparable institutions. 
 We illustrate these developments by a discussion of civil rights law, 
especially as it relates to policing.  Scholars have noted the administrative 
turn in civil rights doctrine.
3
  The classic Warren- and Burger-Court era 
cases have proven inadequate to many “second generation” problems.  
First-generation problems typically involved intentionally harmful or 
egregiously irresponsible conduct.  Classic doctrine often defined liability 
in terms of individualistic psychological notions such as “discriminatory 
intent” or “deliberate indifference” and prescribed remedies in the form of 
bureaucratic-type rules.  By contrast, second generation cases often arise 
from unreflective or normatively ambiguous conduct that, although 
troubling, does not fit the psychological premises of classic doctrine.  
Legislators, judges, and regulators often find that they cannot confidently 
promulgate or apply substantive rules to remedy problems that generate 
such claims.  Thus, they have been drawn to an alternative approach: The 
law-makers can require the institutional actors to assess their own conduct 
and can then appraise the adequacy of this self-assessment.  This regulatory 
approach has an affinity with the core techniques of post-bureaucratic 
organization, which are designed to reduce precisely the behavioral 
unreflectiveness and normative ambiguity that create problems for classic 
civil rights doctrine.  Classic civil-rights doctrine tends to treat managerial 
inquiry and control as pre-requisites for responsibility; the emerging duty 
treats them as entailments of responsibility.   
 The reform of policing exemplifies this evolution.  Post-bureaucratic 
transformation came late to policing, but its manifestations are now 
pervasive.  Courts have been a major influence.  This influence has not been 
transmitted primarily through declarations of substantive rights enforced 
through the exclusionary rule or damage actions.  The most important 
avenue of judicial influence in recent years has been structural reform.   In 
                                                 
3
  Gillian Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 Texas L. Rev. 1897 (2013); 
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a 
Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 Michigan L. Rev. 
1265, 1285-92 (2012); Olatunde Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Columbia Law Review 374 
(2008); Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn in Antidiscrimination Law, 94 California 
L. Rev. 1 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination, 101 
Columbia L. Rev. (2001). 
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many cases where private plaintiffs or the Department of Justice has alleged 
recurring civil rights violations, intervention has focused on changes in 
administrative processes.  Appellate authority, however, remains conflicted 
about such intervention, as some judges urge deference to administrative 
discretion for fear that structural relief would rigidify administration.  In 
doing so, they often appear to assume mistakenly that such intervention 
would have to take bureaucratic forms.    
 Although the trend toward post-bureaucratic reform is clear, we note 
two ambiguities in it.  First, post-bureaucratic policing can take different 
organizational forms.  In particular, alternatives vary in the extent to which 
they emphasize innovation and decentralization.  Second, judicial remedies 
differ in the extent to which they focus on specialized procedures for civil-
rights compliance, as opposed to broader reforms that reach into the 
agency’s core activities. 
 We illustrate the contrasting trajectories reform might take through a 
comparison of New York, where a federal district court held policing 
practices unlawful in 2013, and Cincinnati, which settled a civil rights 
challenge to policing practices in 2002.   Both cases manifest the structural 
turn. They owe more to an implicit duty of responsible administration than 
to any particular substantive norm.  They tend to mandate the key elements 
of post-bureaucratic administration – explicit but provisional policy-setting 
on matters previously left to tacit discretion, monitoring, and re-assessment 
in the light of experience and evidence.    
 However, the two regimes embody the opposing poles of post-
bureaucratic policing.  New York’s, sometimes called Assertive Policing, 
focuses on rapid deployment of personnel to implement a limited set of 
standard solutions, especially street confrontations and minor-offense 
enforcement.  By contrast, Cincinnati has adopted an approach called 
Problem-Oriented Policing that emphasizes varied, innovative, and 
localized responses, often developed in collaboration with stakeholders.  
 The two cities also reflect different approaches to judicial 
remediation. The New York intervention emphasizes specialized procedures 
designed to constrain civil-rights violations.  By contrast, Cincinnati’s 
intervention required comprehensive reform of the city’s policing practices, 
in particular, the adoption of Problem-Oriented Policing.  The scope of the 
Cincinnati intervention is unique among judicially-induced resolutions in 
policing cases.  However, some provisions that appear increasingly in 
settlements blur the distinction between specialized and systemic reform by 
requiring re-assessment of crime-control tactics associated with recurrent 
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civil-rights violations.  Cincinnati might be viewed as an especially 
ambitious development of such initiatives.  At the same time, Cincinnati 
resembles holistic civil-rights interventions in other areas, including labor 
standards, education, and child welfare.   
 In part II, we show that the changing nature of civil-rights claims 
has pushed doctrine to focus on administration but that the move has been 
intermittent and incomplete.  In Part III we discuss the evolution of 
policing.  We show that policing has evolved beyond the bureaucratic forms 
assumed in classic civil rights doctrine but that this evolution involves 
multiple trajectories with potentially different implications for civil rights 
enforcement.  In Part IV, we contrast conventional judicially-supervised 
reform in New York with the more ambitious initiative in Cincinnati and 
suggest some advantages of the latter.  Existing research does not establish 
the superiority of either model (in part because it often fails to distinguish 
them).  Yet, the Cincinnati approach has potential advantages for both crime 
control and civil rights that warrant experimentation and research.  In 
particular, it appears less prone than the New York approach to antagonize 
and deter cooperation from minority communities and better able to take 
account of the costs indiscriminate criminalization of nonviolent disorderly 
conduct. 
 
 
 II. The Evolution of Civil Rights Doctrine 
 
 Confronted by new problems that resist substantive regulation, civil 
rights doctrine has increasingly addressed administration.  It has imposed 
duties that require defendants to clarify and assess rigorously their own 
interpretations of the norms that govern them. The trend, however, has been 
halting, and doctrine sometimes perpetuates older premises about 
organization that are in important respects anachronistic. 
 
 A. The Organizational Premises of Classic Doctrine 
 Classic doctrine drew on two models from the past.  The first, which 
dates from the early years of the republic, sees public officials as 
autonomous actors exercising broad discretion within fairly clear, 
judicially-elaborated constraints.
4
  The second, which dates from the 
                                                 
4
 Jerry Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred 
Years of Administrative Law (2012). 
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Progressive and New Deal eras, sees them as bureaucrats exercising low-
visibility discretion in the interstices of webs of hierarchically-promulgated 
rules.
5
   
 Doctrine often simply ignored the organizational context of 
government and treated officials as lone individuals.  When it did recognize 
public organization, it tended to ignore managerial action other than making 
or following rules, and it more or less explicitly disregarded managerial 
inaction.  When deciding whether to intervene, the courts sometimes acted 
or spoke as if their intervention would necessarily take a quasi-bureaucratic, 
rule-based form.  They treated the decision to intervene as a choice between 
the judicial imposition of rules or deference to administrative discretion, 
and often decided to hold back for fear of excessively cramping discretion.  
 The tendency to see government as either independent individual 
action or bureaucracy is salient in the two core substantive civil rights 
doctrines that address frontline policing – antidiscrimination and search-
and-seizure.  The tendencies can also be seen in procedural doctrine on the 
attribution of frontline conduct to agencies or senior managers and on 
injunctive relief. 
 1. Anti-Discrimination.  The premise of the autonomous official is 
most salient in anti-discrimination doctrine.  Liability turns here on “intent” 
to discriminate.  Application of the idea was fairly straightforward when 
lawsuits challenged rules that explicitly distinguished among races or 
genders or practices that officials discussed in explicitly racist or sexist 
terms.  However, partly as a result of the success of past litigation, 
explicitly racist or sexist rules and official discourse have virtually 
disappeared from public life.  “Second generation” challenges typically 
address decisions or practices that are not facially discriminatory but that 
foreseeably or demonstrably harm protected groups disproportionately.  If 
an employer makes hiring decisions under legitimate but vague standards 
like “diligent” and “resourceful”, bias may not be evident in any one 
decision, but if the overall pattern disfavors a protected group, suspicion 
arises.  Or if the employer uses a specific rule like a high-school graduation 
requirement, the fact that the rule, even though facially neutral, disqualifies 
more black than white candidates generates concern. 
                                                 
5
  William H. Simon, The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law, 78 Law 
& Contemporary Problems 101 (2015).  On the idea of bureaucracy as a combination of 
rigid rules and low-visibility discretion, see Alvin Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial 
Bureaucracy (1954) and Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (1964). 
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 However, discriminatory intent is more elusive in a world of tacit 
discrimination.  Even when the challenged action is motivated by group-
based animus, it may be hard to prove the animus when the defendant’s 
agents take care to hide it.  More fundamentally, once we get beyond old-
fashioned prejudice, it is hard to define, much less discover, intent.  The 
Supreme Court says that the challenged decision must have been made 
“because of, not merely in spite of” the harm it inflicts on a protected 
group.
6
  This seems ambiguous or seriously under-inclusive.  In 
organizations, much harmful conduct is unpurposeful and unreflective.  It 
arises from “selective indifference”, or cognitive stereotyping, or inertial 
perpetuation of routine.
7
  In such cases, what is objectionable is precisely 
the actor’s inattentiveness to the harm. 
 Doctrine has responded by allowing plaintiffs to support their cases 
with evidence of disparate outcomes or effects.
8
  If hiring decisions under 
general standards go disproportionately against women or the high school 
diploma requirement disproportionately disadvantages blacks, the courts 
may recognize a rebuttable inference of discrimination.  The inference has 
to be rebuttable because there are possible legitimate explanations for the 
disparities. Perhaps high school graduation reliably predicts better job 
performance.  The key question is how strong the burden of rebuttal is.  If a 
facially non-frivolous recitation of a legitimate purpose is enough, much 
unfairness will go unredressed.  On the other hand, requiring the defendant 
to produce rigorous scientific validation for its decisions may generate 
overbroad liability because such validation is either prohibitively expensive 
or inconclusive. 
 The courts have been especially sensitive in criminal justice to the 
dangers of constraining legitimate practice through excessive liability.  In 
                                                 
6
  Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884,      (1974). 
7
  Paul Brest, In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 
(1976) (on “selective indifference”); Linda Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1161 (1995) (on cognitive stereotyping); John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct    
(on inertial perpetuation of routine).  On the general problem of “racism without racists”, 
see Richard Thompson Ford, The Race Card (2008). 
8
  Pamela Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination, 59 Fordham L. 
Rev. 523 581-91 (1995).   Disparate impact liability has been explicitly recognized under 
Titles VI (federal grantees), VII (employers), and VII (housing marketers) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1064 and under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Texas Dept. of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S.     , (2015), 
Slip. Op. at 8-12; Johnson, Disparity Rules, cited in note   above, at 386-401. 
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declining to entertain a challenge to sentencing practices based on 
exceptionally rigorous disparate impact evidence, the Supreme Court said in 
McCleskey v. Kemp that giving weight to such evidence “would throw…  
into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice 
system.”9 
 2. Search-and-seizure.  The second view of organizational liability 
in classic doctrine – the bureaucratic one – is salient in search-and-seizure 
doctrine.  This doctrine rejects the subjective “intent” focus of anti-
discrimination.  Instead, its touchstone is “objective reasonableness.”10  One 
might have thought that this perspective would lead in the police area, as it 
did in common law professional negligence, to broad supervision under 
norms derived from professional culture and practice.  Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness, however, differs from the common law duty-of-care in 
negligence actions.  It is a set of more or less specific norms promulgated 
by the courts (or occasionally, legislatures) on the basis of an ostensibly 
utilitarian calculus.
11
 
 The courts insist that these norms take the form of “readily 
administrable rules”. They emphasize that Fourth Amendment norms have 
to be “applied on the spur of (and in the heat of) the moment” and thus 
cannot contain too many “ifs, ands, or buts”.12   Indeed, even as the courts 
try to make the rules as simple as possible, they do not hold officers 
accountable for unlawful practices unless the courts’ prior pronouncements 
unambiguously covered the situation at hand.  Thus, the qualified 
immunity” doctrine provides that liability for unreasonable searches and 
seizures can only be imposed where the action violates a “clearly 
established” duty.13  
                                                 
9
  481 U.S. 279, 315  (1987).  See also id. at 282: “Because discretion is essential to 
the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would 
infer that discretion has been abused…”. 
10
  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
11
  John Rappaport, Second Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 
205, 215-17 (2015) (reviewing Fourth Amendment and other cases in which courts have 
imposed “specified conduct rules” on law enforcement). 
12
  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001). 
13
  Brosseau v. Haugent, 543 U.S. 194,    (2004) (holding that officers are not liable 
for “constitutionally deficient conduct” unless the deficiency was “clearly established” in a 
“particularized sense” relating to the circumstances of the officer’s challenged act).   Some 
cases even take the view that only judicial authority within the circuit where the conduct 
occurred can clearly establish a duty.  E.g., Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F3d 
950, 955 (11
th
 Cir. 2003).  But other cases disagree.  E.g., Owens v. Lott, 372 F. 3d 267 
279-80 (4
th
 Cir. 2004). 
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 In effect, the courts treat frontline officers like low-level 
bureaucrats.  And they cast themselves in the role of bureaucratic rule-
maker.  At the same time, they recognize the importance of broad frontline 
discretion, which they sometimes treat as effectively unregulable.  When a 
court finds that the plaintiffs’ claim cannot be formulated as an 
administrable substantive rule, it dismisses.
14
 
 3. Attribution under 1983.  Both the autonomous-individual and the 
rule-based perspectives underlie doctrine on the attribution of frontline 
conduct to public institutions.  Individualism is salient in the practice of 
naming individual officers, and sometimes, only individual officers.  
Naming individual officers is partly a formalistic evasion of the traditional 
sovereign immunity of the federal government and the states.  But even 
where doctrine permits suing government by name – for example, with 
municipalities – plaintiffs purport to seek relief against individuals, despite 
the fact that the officers are virtually always indemnified for liability. 
 With both public entity and senior officer defendants, the question 
arises when such defendants are accountable for the wrongdoing of senior 
officers.  The Supreme Court has dealt with this question extensively under 
42 USC 1983 – the procedural vehicle for most civil rights suits against 
state officials.
15
  Early in the development of 1983 doctrine the courts 
rejected importing the private law respondeat superior principle to make 
public agencies (or their heads), in effect, strictly liable for most wrongful 
subordinate conduct intended to advance the agencies’ public purposes.  
Respondeat superior seemed to risk too much judicial intrusion.  The courts 
could have responded to this problem by predicating entity or employer 
liability on a showing of irresponsible (negligent or reckless) 
mismanagement or failure to manage subordinates.  Instead, at least 
initially, they demanded a showing that the agent conduct was in some 
sense “authorized.”  The conventional form of authorization was a “policy”, 
which meant most often in practice, a hierarchically-promulgated rule. In 
the landmark Monnell case, the court rejected the claim that the “mere right 
to control without any direction or control having been exercised” was 
sufficient.
16
    
                                                 
14
  Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. at 350  (stating as ground for rejection that 
“plaintiff’s proposed rule … promises very little in the way of administrability”). 
15
  42 U.S.C. 1983 (providing for a cause of action against anyone who, “under color 
of” state law, causes a deprivation of a federal right). 
16
  Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58 (1978) (citing 
Rizzo v. Goode). 
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 4. Structural Relief.  Finally, organizational premises surfaced in the 
ambivalence toward structural relief in classic doctrine.  The presumptive 
forms of relief for police wrongdoing were motions to suppress illegally 
seized evidence and damage judgments. Both procedures had well-
recognized limits.  Suppression was only available in the small fraction of 
police-citizen encounters that resulted in the filing of charges, and damage 
actions required large investments of energy and resources.  When these 
remedies did prove effective for complainants, they often involved what 
seemed excessive public costs, especially where suppression thwarted 
otherwise valid prosecutions.  Moreover, since responsibility for challenged 
conduct was usually diffuse and ambiguous and officers almost never bore 
liability costs personally, neither procedure had demonstrably strong 
deterrent effects.  Nevertheless, these remedies made sense from the 
perspective of bureaucratic organization.  Bureaucracies acted systemically 
through rules.  If a rule was bad, declaratory judicial relief could correct it, 
but individual frontline wrongdoing was assumed to be idiosyncratic.
17
  
Case-by-case remediation of the sort provided by suppression motions or 
damage action was well designed to correct idiosyncratic error. 
 But, of course, the courts in the classic era dealt with some 
situations where reactive and individualized intervention was plainly 
inadequate.  Beginning with schools and moving to other public institutions, 
they developed the structural injunction.  This form of relief became highly 
controversial, and the appellate courts became ambivalent about it.  They 
never repudiated it, but they issued various cautions to the lower courts.  
For reasons of respect for other levels or branches of government or of 
relative expertise, appellate doctrine has portrayed structural intervention as 
a last resort.  The strictures have been especially severe with respect to 
policing, the subject of two landmark cases disapproving structural 
challenges. 
 In Rizzo v. Goode, the Court reversed an order mandating that the 
Philadelphia police adopt a complaint process consistent with “generally 
accepted minimum standards” on the basis of evidence of sixteen incidents 
of frontline misconduct over the course of a year.  The court noted that there 
is no independent “right” to an adequate complaint process and ruled that 
the evidence of instances of misconduct did not suffice for systemic relief 
                                                 
17
  See James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, and Daniel Roos, The Machine that 
Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production 57 (1990) (“In [bureaucratic] plants, 
problems tended to be treated as random events.  The idea was to repair each error and 
hope that it didn’t recur.”) 
12 
 
where the conduct was not authorized by departmental policy and senior 
officials “played no affirmative part” in it.”18 
 In Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, the Court reversed an order 
enjoining the use of “choke-holds” in certain circumstances and mandating 
training programs and record-keeping to insure compliance with the 
prohibition.
19
  There was no dispute in Lyons that at least some of the 
challenged conduct was systemic because it was authorized by department 
policy.  But the Court reversed on the ground that the lone plaintiff could 
not assert the threat of “real and immediate” injury necessary for standing 
on the basis of a single past encounter in which he had been improperly 
subjected to the hold.  The Court emphasized that the possibility that he 
would be subjected to it again appeared small and speculative.  The court 
has not always refused to recognize standing on the basis of a small 
probability of official injury;
20
 so the case seems to reflect in part deference 
to police discretion. 
 The underlying premise of much classical doctrine is that 
managerial inquiry and control are pre-requisites of duty rather than 
entailments of it.  Although the premise is pervasive, it is hard to find an 
explicit defense of it.  It appears to rest on an assumption that organizations 
take the form of classical bureaucracy in which senior officers influence 
conduct only by commanding it through rules.  It follows that they are not 
responsible for conduct they have not mandated by rule (i.e., “authorized”).  
Perhaps the courts also believe that there are no standards by which they 
could define affirmative duties of responsible administration apart from the 
commands of substantive law.
21
 
* * * 
 The doctrine thus ignores that organizations in recent decades have 
been less prone to take bureaucratic forms.  Moreover, even when 
organizations are formally bureaucracies, it is well recognized that senior 
managers influence frontline practice in ways other than through 
                                                 
18
 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 369-70 (1976). 
19
 Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
20
  See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 133 S..Ct. 1138, 1161-64 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing several cases allowing standing on the basis of 
speculative prospect of injury from official action and arguing that they are 
indistinguishable from the instant case in which the majority denied standing, citing Lyons, 
to a challenge to national-security surveillance practices). 
21
  Even in the private sphere, the duty of corporate managers to manage proactively 
was not clearly recognized until the 1990s.  In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litigation, 698 
A.2d 959, 969-70 (Del. 1996)   
13 
 
promulgating rules.  They can selectively fail to enforce rules, or make 
resources available for some practices and not others, or they can measure 
and reward some conduct while ignoring other conduct.  Indeed, to limit 
accountability of senior officials to violations they know about and/or 
authorize is to leave doctrine powerless against one of the most 
characteristic pathologies of modern organizations – strategically selective 
knowledge and attention.  Managers monitor and enforce the goals they 
care about, while ignoring how their subordinates achieve their performance 
levels.  Corporate executives can set and reward large sales targets without 
paying attention to frauds or kickbacks; police executives can set and 
reward targets for stops and arrests without paying attention to Fourth 
Amendment violations.  Managers may feel they are worse off if they have 
knowledge about compliance with norms that impede their primary goals.  
Ignorance gives them “deniability”.22 
 
 B. The Emerging Duty of Responsible Administration 
 The organizational presuppositions of the classic cases no longer 
apply to many realms of public administration, including most of those in 
which current civil rights issues arise.  The evolution of administrative style 
seems a function partly of changes in technology and partly of changes in 
the problems facing government.  Bureaucracy lends itself to situations 
where there is confidence in relatively stable and uniform interventions.  In 
situations where problems and solutions are not well understood or where 
intervention has to take account of varying contexts, bureaucracy is less 
effective.  In these situations, intervention must take the form partly of 
investigation and must accommodate adaptation and customization. 
 Consequently, post-bureaucratic organization does not focus on 
balancing stable rules and lightly supervised discretion.
23
  Its central 
                                                 
22
  See, e.g., Craig Haney and Donald Specter, Treatment Rights in Uncertain Times, 
in Treating Adult and Juvenile Offenders with Special Needs 51, 70 (Joseph B. Ashford et 
al., ed.s 2001) (reporting testimony by the head of the California Department of 
Corrections that he resisted screening inmates for mental illness “because he knew that 
once mentally ill individuals were identifiable he would be responsible for treating them”).  
On the role of “contrived ignorance” in contemporary political and business misconduct, 
see William H. Simon, Wrongs of Ignorance and Ambiguity: Lawyer Responsibility for 
Collective Misconduct, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 3-9 (2005). 
23
  Our contrast between bureaucratic and post-bureaucratic organization is based on 
a vast literature observing and recommending a basic transition in organizational form.  
Although there are varying formulations, the contrast can be presented usefully as two ideal 
types: 
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mandate to senior managers is not rule-promulgation but planning, 
monitoring, and re-assessment.  Plans differ from rules in being more 
comprehensive and more provisional.  Monitoring is important not only to 
induce compliance with the dictates of the plan but to facilitate learning.  A 
key part of the manager’s job is to collect and publicize information about 
unanticipated problems and successes so that frontline agents can learn 
from each other and the agency can learn from peer institutions engaged 
with comparable problems.  Re-assessment involves deliberative 
engagement between and among senior managers, frontline agents, and 
where appropriate, stakeholders, about the ends and means of intervention.  
Such engagement fuels continuous re-articulation of the plan.    
                                                                                                                            
 Bureaucracy, in the mid-20
th
 century conception, is a balance of rules and low-
visibility discretion.  The basic idea is to implement a program developed at the top and 
revised only episodically.  Frontline discretion thus tends to be regretted and minimized.  
Nevertheless, because full compliance is thought unattainable and perhaps also undesirable, 
a residuum of such discretion is accepted.  This residuum is unavoidable because 
monitoring capacity is limited; it is also potentially benign to the extent that it enables 
frontline workers to mitigate harshness or waste in situations where application of the rules 
would be counter-productive of their underlying purposes.  Three structural features 
follow: (1) The paradigmatic norm is the rule.  Rules tend to be inflexible and to be 
interpreted formally.  (2) Monitoring of frontline agents focuses on compliance with the 
rules, but because it is expensive and demoralizing, monitoring is limited and reactive, 
focused especially on responding to complaints.  (3) Rules tend to be stable, revised only 
episodically and in processes centered at the top. 
 What we call post-bureaucratic organization rejects both inflexible rules and low-
visibility discretion.  Senior officials view program norms as provisional and expect to 
develop them in the light of experience gained at the frontline.  Organization tries to 
combine continuous improvement with transparency and frontline initiative with 
accountability.  The characteristic structural features are these: (1) The paradigmatic norm 
is the plan.  Plans are more comprehensive than rules, and their norms are interpreted 
purposively.  Frontline agents are expected to depart from them when following them 
would be counter-productive, but they must signal their departures in ways that trigger 
review of their decisions.  (2) Monitoring is proactive and based on audits as well as 
complaints.  Monitors assess, not just compliance with the norms, but also the effectiveness 
of the practice prescribed by the norms.  (3) Norms are revised more or less continuously in 
the light of information from monitoring.  Frontline workers participate in the process of 
norm revision. 
 For discussion and citations to the literature, see Charles F. Sabel, A Real Time 
Revolution in Routines in The Corporation as a Collaborative Community 106-56 (Charles 
Hecksher and Paul Adler, ed.s 2006); Simon, Organizational Premises, cited in note  , at     
.  Popular accounts include Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the 
Learning Organization (1990); Womack, Jones, and Roos, cited in note    
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 The rule-of-law implications of post-bureaucratic administration are 
different from those expressed in classic civil-right doctrine.  Post-
bureaucratic administration insists on self-consciousness and explicitness.  
Where it finds unflectiveness and ambiguity, it sees them, not as intractable 
conditions of organizational life, but as symptoms of administrative failure.  
Where such failure manifestly threatens civil rights values, judges can 
intervene without becoming bureaucrats themselves.  They can require 
administrators to make policies explicit, to give reasons for them, to 
supervise their implementation in a transparent way, and to re-assess 
periodically.   We should not expect public officials to have broad 
discretion over the degree to which they will be accountable for their 
exercise of discretion.  Inducing this kind of reflection and transparency 
makes practice more predictable to citizens and facilitates political 
mechanisms of oversight.  Transparent administrative practice makes it 
easier for courts to apply whatever substantive constraints there are on 
practice.  Moreover, when practice is reliably articulate across jurisdictions, 
both courts and political agencies may be able to derive minimum 
substantive standards empirically by noting which practices have 
widespread acceptance and putting pressure on outliers to adopt them or at 
least produce good explanations for not doing so.
24
  
 This post-bureaucratic structural approach has been incorporated 
into some important civil rights statutes and regulations.  Instead of 
categorically defining prohibited conduct, these laws mandate that actors 
make plans to vindicate a value or achieve a goal, monitor the 
implementation of the plan, and re-assess the plan in the light of experience.  
Examples include the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act requiring that states plan to reduce “disproportionate 
minority contracts” in the criminal justice system and those of the Prison 
                                                 
24
      Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 17-19 (invoking as support for holding 
that deadly force cannot be used against fleeing suspected non-violent felons the articulated 
practice standards in most police agencies), with Whren v. U.S. 517 U.S. 806, 814-15 
(1996) (dismissing the claim that Fourth Amendment reasonableness should be measured 
by “usual police practices” or the conduct of a “reasonable police officer”, saying that the 
Court could not “plumb the collective consciousness of law enforcement”). 
 Pertinent here is the argument of Yale public law scholars that many fundamental 
public law principles develop in a process of deliberative engagement and experimentation 
that leads to the identification and judicial condemnation of outliers. E.g., William 
Eskridge and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes (2011).   
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Rape Elimination Act requiring that prison officials plan to achieve “zero 
tolerance” of sexual assault.25   
 The “reasonable accommodation” requirement for employers in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act is another important development.
26
  Like 
the Juvenile Justice statute, it abandons the intent requirement of classic 
doctrine and requires reasonable proactive assessment and mitigation of 
disparate impacts.  Unlike the Juvenile Justice and Prison Rape acts, it does 
not specifically mandate planning, monitoring, and reassessment, but it 
gives employers incentives to engage in such activities in order to 
demonstrate compliance. 
 Judicial doctrine continues to pay at least superficial homage to the 
organizational premises of classicism and is frequently seriously 
constrained by them.  Much doctrine continues to veer between substantive 
prescription and ostensibly prudential withdrawal.  Some decisions have 
moved toward the structural approach but often only tentatively or 
indirectly.
27
  We find both progress and constraint in the key areas that bear 
on policing – antidiscrimination, search-and-seizure, 1983 attribution, and 
systemic relief. 
 1. Anti-discrimination.  Commenters have argued that the best way 
for the courts to apply general anti-discrimination norms to second-
generation problems is to recognize an affirmative duty to make reasonable 
efforts to investigate, assess, and mitigate disparate harms to protected 
groups.
28
  Reasonableness would then imply the kinds of post-bureaucratic 
procedures specifically mandated in statutes like the Juvenile Justice and 
Prison Rape acts.  No cases have followed this path explicitly, but some 
                                                 
25
  E.g., Prison Rape Elimination Act, Public Law 105-220, 112 Stat. 97242..  The 
relevant amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act are codified 
at 42 USC 5633.  They are discussed in Johnson, cited in note   ; and Sabel and Simon, 
cited in note   .  See also USC 12143(c)(7) (provision of Americans with Disabilities Act 
mandating that certain public transportation systems develop plans to accommodate 
disabled passengers).   
26
  28 USC 12111. 
27
  Rappaport, cited in note   , at 220-31, reviews cases in several constitutional areas 
taking a structural (“second-order) approach to rights elaboration.   
28
  Krieger, cited in note   , at   (proposing that Title VII be interpreted to create 
“prescriptive duty to identify and control for errors in social perception and judgment 
which inevitably occur, even among the well-intended.”); Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in 
the Air: Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 Stanford L. Rev. 1381, 1384 
(2014) (arguing for a “duty of care to avoid unnecessarily perpetuating social segregation 
or hierarchy”).   
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have done so indirectly.   The indirect approach treats reasonable proactive 
efforts as rebuttal to inferences drawn from evidence of harm to protected 
groups. 
 When plaintiffs produce evidence of disparate impact under Titles 
VI, VII, or VIII of the Civil Rights Act, defendants must produce evidence 
of a business rationale for the decisions.  Although the authority varies on 
the strength of this burden, it clearly requires more than a recitation of a 
legitimate purpose.  Employers sometimes produce elaborate, 
methodologically rigorous studies that make explicit the criteria on which 
decisions are based and validate the predictive value of these criteria for 
productivity.  The courts sometimes suggest that even demonstrably 
predictive criteria are unacceptable if there are equally effective (or perhaps, 
almost as effective) alternatives that are less harmful to the protected group.  
(Perhaps a college degree predicts productivity, but so would an honorable 
discharge from the military.)   
 In theory, the purpose of the stronger rebuttal requirements is to 
negate the inference that the asserted purpose is a “pretext” for purposeful 
discrimination.  However, rebuttal is often expensive, and it is unusual to 
demand this amount of substantiation for a party’s denial of wrongdoing.  A 
better explanation for requiring an employer to critically examine practices 
that disproportionately disadvantage protected groups is that, given the 
stakes for the group members and the social commitment to equality, it 
would be irresponsible not to examine them.  Moreover, cases holding that 
a demonstrably valid criterion is insufficient when there are less harmful 
alternatives, even if the less harmful ones are slightly more expensive to 
administer, seem to interpret the general non-discrimination language of the 
Civil Rights Act to imply something like the “reasonable accommodation” 
requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act.   Pamela Perry notes 
that while disparate impact doctrine usually purports to follow an “intent 
theory”, the more demanding cases are better understood in terms of a 
“fault” theory presupposing a duty to take reasonable care to avoid disparate 
impacts.
29
  At this point, the duty of non-discrimination has become in 
substantial part a duty of responsible administration.  
                                                 
29
  Cited in note  , at 581-91.  See also Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and 
Accommodation, 115 Harvard Law Review 640, 651-683 (2001) (demonstrating that many 
cases decided under authority that does not explicitly require reasonable accommodation 
impose liability for the defendant’s failure to mitigate harm to protected groups even 
though mitigation is costly). 
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 In criminal justice, however, the courts have tended to resist 
disparate-impact evidence and insist on direct proof of intent with respect to 
individual discrimination claims.
30
  As we will see in a moment, class 
claims for systemic relief are another matter. 
 2. Search and Seizure.  Of the four doctrines we are considering, 
substantive search-and-seizure doctrine has evolved the least, though its 
limitations are increasingly recognized.
31
   
 The dominant perspective in substantive Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been the autonomous officer.  The courts most often 
assess the “objective reasonableness” of challenged practice from the point 
of view of the individual officer at the point where she decides whether to 
intervene.
32
   Courts have recognized a duty on the part of that officer to 
make reasonable efforts to inform herself within the confines of the 
situation.
33
  Where the inference that prompted the initial stop is “dispelled 
by information gained” in the course of the stop, she must forego further 
detention or search.
34
 But neither the officer nor the department is 
                                                 
30
  Samuel Gross and Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug 
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 Michigan L. Rev. 1, 87 (2002) (stating that no case has 
approved suppression on the basis of statistical proof).   Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 
598, 610 (1985) (holding that a showing that a prosecutorial policy had a “discriminatory 
effect” was insufficient and that a challenger must show “that the government intended 
such a result”); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that a litigant 
alleging selective prosecution must plead specifically that similarly situated people were 
treated differently before pursuing discovery); Angela Davis, Prosecution and Race: The 
Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 31 (1998) (asserting that 
Armstrong makes challenges to selective prosecution a “virtual impossibility”).  Also 
pertinent here is Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which permits “pretextual” police 
stops by holding that the Fourth Amendment requirement of probable cause does not 
require that there be such cause for the suspicion that motivated the stop as long as there is 
cause for suspicion of some crime, for example, a minor traffic violation.  Whren was 
formally a Fourth Amendment case, but the plaintiff specifically argued for judicial 
regulation on the ground that pretextual stops facilitated race discrimination.  517 U.S. at    
.  Some believe that, given the difficulty of proving discriminatory intent, Whren 
“conferred upon police virtual carte blanche to stop people because of the color of their 
skin.”  1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 1.4(e), at 123 (3d ed. 1996) 
31
  E.g., Rappaport, cited in note   , at 231-64, arguing for more emphasis on “second-
order” judicial regulation under the Fourth Amendment. 
32
  Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 396.   
33
  E.g., U.S. v. Brugal, 185 F.3d 205, 210 (4
th
 Cir. 1999) (holding search 
unreasonable where defendant explained his initially suspicious highway exit by saying 
that he needed gas and officer could have verified by examining gas gauge).   
34
  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
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accountable for her state of knowledge prior to the encounter.  This is 
important because this ex ante knowledge is not independent of the 
department’s practices.  It is a function of the policing styles and structures 
the department chooses. A department that invests in gathering intelligence 
and making it available to frontline officers may stop people who turn out to 
be law-abiding less frequently than one that does not.  Yet, at least under 
substantive doctrine, the reasonableness inquiry does not extend to the 
agency’s background efforts to develop information. 
 The court has emphasized the narrowness of the range within which 
the “reasonableness” norm operates.  In Whren v. U.S., the Supreme Court 
said that Fourth Amendment regulatory efforts were largely for “searches or 
seizures conducted in an extraordinary manner”, such as those involving 
deadly force, entry into dwellings, or bodily invasion.
35
   Whren involved a 
more routine “pretextual” search in which the police used a traffic violation, 
for which there was probable cause, as an excuse for a search motivated by 
suspicion of a more serious crime.  After holding that motive was irrelevant 
to “objective reasonablenesss”, it went on to state that probable cause was 
sufficient to establish reasonableness.  The court recognized that 
enforcement of traffic laws is massively under-inclusive but denied that the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness imposed any constraint on decisions as 
to what searches and seizures to conduct among those for which there is 
probable cause.
36
  In another case, the court specifically rejected the 
suggestion that there should be any obligation to adopt the “less restrictive 
alternative” among the available enforcement options.37 
 So the Fourth Amendment reasonableness norm does not regulate 
the agency’s efforts to develop information or its enforcement strategy.  The 
explanation for this limitation remains the bureaucratic conception of 
organization.  For the court, constraint must take the form of more or less 
categorical rule; so that when such rules are infeasible, the court must 
withdraw.
38
  Again, however, the story becomes more complicated when we 
look at attribution doctrine and remedial practice in class actions. 
                                                 
35
  Whren, 517 U.S. at 818. 
36
  Id., at 816-19. 
37
  Atwater, 532 U.S., at 350-51 (“The logic of such elaborate less-restrictive-
alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all search-
and-seizure powers.”) 
38
  Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19 (“we are aware of no principle that would allow us to 
decide at what point …infraction itself can no longer be the ordinary measure of the 
lawfulness of enforcement”). 
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 3. Attribution.  Doctrine has moved considerably on the issue of 
when institutions will be chargeable for the wrongful conduct of 
subordinate agents.   
 The most dramatic development has been in the private sector under 
Title VII.  In Faragher v. City of Boca Rotan the Supreme Court adopted an 
approach designed to avoid both strict liability and judicial withdrawal.  
This was a sexual harassment case in which the plaintiff proved many 
instances of indisputable misconduct on the part of middle- and lower-level 
employees.  The court rejected the defendant’s claim that liability required 
“active or affirmative, as opposed to passive or implicit, misuse of 
supervisory authority.”  Instead, it held that such workplace misconduct 
would be presumptively attributed to the employer but that the employer 
could rebut by showing “that it had exercised reasonable care to avoid 
harassment and to eliminate it when it might occur, and that the 
complaining employee had failed to exercise like reasonable care.”39  
Feragher appears to have prompted pervasive corporate efforts to develop 
and monitor sexual misconduct policies.   
 In the public sector, courts in 1983 cases have qualified the classical 
insistence on top-level authorization by holding that “deliberate 
indifference” on the part of senior administrators will suffice.  Like 
“discriminatory intent”, deliberate indifference is a concept that owes more 
to doctrinal desperation than psychological insight.  In practice, it is 
established by passivity in the face of knowledge of subordinate 
misconduct.  In addition, courts have recognized 1983 liability for “failure 
to train and supervise” and “failure to screen” employees.40  In some 
respects, the doctrine parallels the enforcement duties recognized in the 
Title VII employment context in Faragher.  However, the 1983 authority 
has yet to specifically recognize duties to promulgate policies and acquire 
information.
41
  Perhaps the duty to “supervise” is broad enough to 
                                                 
39
  Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804-05 (1998).  See also 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (recognizing as part of an 
affirmative defense to a sexual harassment claim that “the employer exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct promptly” harassing behavior).  For interpretations that see such 
cases as a more general trend, see  Sturm, cited in note   .Bagenstos, cited in note     ; Ford, 
cited in note   . 
40
  City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 813 (1985); Board of County 
Commissioners v. Brown, 520 US 397 (1997); Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 
297-98 (1992). 
41
  But see Thomas v. Cook Co. Sheriff’s Dept., 588 F.3d 445, 454 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(finding as evidence that plaintiff’s injuries arose from official policy “the failure to have a 
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encompass such activities.  If so, it would be a small step in principle from 
this authority to a duty of responsible administration.  Some commentators, 
however, are pessimistic about the practical prospects for such expansion.
42
 
 The rejection of respondeat superior in favor of “deliberate 
indifference” has committed the courts to make some judgments about the 
adequacy of administrative effort. Doing so requires them to broaden the 
individualistic perspective it often adopted in substantive discrimination and 
search-and-seizure doctrine.  Substantive doctrine takes the local 
perspective of the frontline officer in a particular situation either 
subjectively (with discrimination) or objectively (with search-and-seizure).  
Attribution requires that we step back and examine some of the factors that 
determined how he got there.  
 4. Structural Relief.  While Supreme Court has on occasion 
cautioned lower courts against excessive zeal, it has not categorically 
denied the legitimacy of systemic relief, and the lower courts have given 
such relief against a broad range of public authorities.   
 Rizzo and Lyons did not end structural relief against police 
departments.  In a few cases, Rizzo has been distinguished by proof of a 
larger number of instances of unlawful conduct or by evidence of explicit or 
implicit managerial approval or encouragement.
43
  Lyons has not been 
applied to several racial profiling claims, which are sometimes understood 
to involve a diffuse stigmatic injury to an entire group, and many systemic 
search-and-seizure claims have a racial dimension.
44
  Moreover, standing is 
not a problem for the federal government, and in 1994, in the aftermath of 
the Rodney King trial and ensuing riots, Congress authorized the federal 
government to seek relief against a “pattern or practice” of police conduct in 
violation of federal law.
45
 
 In any event, most cases settle.  No doubt these settlements reflect 
some feeling by defendants that they are vulnerable under the substantive 
                                                                                                                            
system in place to allow prompt review of inmates’ medical requests, the practice of 
severely under-staffing correctional officers, and the failure to fix broken video monitors”) 
(emphasis added). 
42
  See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 George 
Washington L. Rev. 453, 486-90 (2004) (asserting that “failure to train cases are 
notoriously difficult to litigate and even more difficult to win” and discussing a remarkable 
example). 
43
  E.g., Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504 (1992). 
44
  Brandan Garrett, Standing While Black: Distinguishing Lyons in Racial Profiling 
Cases, 100 Columbia L. Rev. 1815 (2000). 
45
  28 U.S.C. 14141. 
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law.  However, some, including Cincinnati and New York, have been 
influenced by political forces catalyzed by the suit.  And while defendants 
usually resent the continuing “outside” scrutiny the settlements require, 
much of what the settlements prescribe involves practices that many peer 
departments have adopted voluntarily and are widely considered to be good 
practice within the professional community.  Peer acceptance may make the 
provisions more palatable to some defendants.  The fact that cases settle for 
reasons not entirely dependent on the substantive merits opens space for 
negotiated remedies to depart from the technical eccentricities of doctrine. 
 Although there is substantial variation among remedies, some best-
practice norms seem to be emerging.  In particular, about 20 agreements 
concluded by the Department of Justice have had wide-ranging influence 
outside the cases where they were negotiated.  According to Samuel Walker 
and Carol Archbold, they are viewed as a set of “standards for constitutional 
policing.”46 
 Walker and Archbold call the dominant pattern PTSR, for Policy, 
Training, Supervision, and Review.
47
  It includes requirements that the 
agency promulgate detailed standards; train staff in the standards, and 
monitor compliance with them. (A major part of the plaintiff’s evidence in 
the recent New York case was based on records that the defendant was 
required to keep under a consent decree in an earlier case.)   The core of the 
new monitoring regime consists of (1) civilian complaint procedures, (2) 
use-of-force or critical-incident policies that require investigations wherever 
police use or threaten physical force, and (3) early intervention systems that 
use civilian complaints and use-of-force reports to detect patterns of poor 
performance by individual officers or their supervisors and intervene with 
warnings, training, or discipline.  While the settlements typically describe 
substantive policies minimally or vaguely, they often go into detail about 
procedure.  For example, the Oakland, California, consent decree specifies 
                                                 
46
  Samuel Walker and Carol Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability 49 
(2014).  For a detailed account of a notable decree with a favorable appraisal of its success, 
see Christopher Stone et al., Policing Los Angeles Under a Consent Decree: The Dynamics 
of Change at the LAPD (May 2009). 
47
  Archbold and Walker, at 16; see also Armacost, cited in note   , at 528-31 
(discussing DOJ consent decree practice).  See Note, Complex Enforcement: 
Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 638-40 (1981) (noting of 
converging remedial provisions in prison cases: “[W]hile they are not constitutional rights 
as such, they seem to represent the criteria of legality and therefor are more than mere 
remedies.”) 
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twenty indicators to be tracked in the department’s early intervention 
system.
48
   
 The complaint, early intervention, and use-of-force processes 
generate signals designed to alert managers to problems.  At a minimum, 
managers should consider whether the signals suggest a need for individual 
training, counseling, or discipline.  More ambitiously, review may consider 
systemic implications.  Department of Justice standards provide that use-of-
force should “include an examination of the police tactics and the 
precipitating events that led to the use of force” and consideration of 
whether the incident “suggests the advisability of revising or formulating 
agency policy, tactics, or training.”49  Although limited to use-of-force 
review, such measures move the agency in the direction of the continuous 
and systemic re-assessment demanded by post-bureaucratic organization.  
They treat error, not as idiosyncratic, but as potentially symptomatic of 
broader dysfunction. 
 
 III. The Evolution of Policing  
 
 The key organizational assumptions of classic doctrine – that 
managers control subordinate conduct mainly through rules and that 
minimally accountable frontline discretion is inevitable – reflect both the 
ideology and practice of mid-twentieth century policing.  However, policing 
has changed more than doctrine.  The dominant policing models are post-
bureaucratic.  Yet, their implications for civil-rights remediation are 
ambiguous because post-bureaucratic administration can take different 
forms.  We illustrate the range of possibilities with two cases:  Assertive 
Policing in New York and Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) in Cincinnati.  
  
 A. From Reaction to Proaction  
 
 Policing was one of the key cases for mid-twentieth century 
sociologists seeking to revise the idea of bureaucracy to acknowledge that 
the top-down rules emphasized in Max Weber’s conception virtually always 
co-existed with low-visibility frontline discretion. Tacit discretion could 
                                                 
48
  Id., at 148.  
49
  U.S. Dept. of Justice, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples of 
Promising Police Practices and Policies 5 (2001); for an example, see Police Assessment 
Resource Center, The Portland Police Bureau: Officer-Involved Shootings and In-Custody 
Deaths 143-60 (Aug 2003). 
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take a malign form as arbitrariness or corruption or a benign form as 
contextual adaptation, but it was considered in one form or another 
unavoidable.   
 James Q. Wilson’s Varieties of Police Behavior, which summed up 
this view in 1968 on the eve of its decline, classified different regimes 
partly in terms of how they balanced rigid rule-following with 
unaccountable discretion.  However, in every jurisdiction he observed, beat 
officer discretion played an important role.  He saw street-level policing as 
virtually a distinct craft culture outside the official bureaucracy in which 
recruits were inducted through apprenticeship to senior officers.
50
 
 In this mid-century view, policing was dominantly reactive.  Police 
responded to calls for service and reports of crimes.  Their key measures of 
success were response time for the former and case closure rates for the 
latter.  Police also patrolled, but patrol tended to be undirected or directed in 
terms of broad “sector-and-shift” categories.  As Wilson reported, “[F]ew 
police administrators show much interest in ‘planning’ the deployment of 
their manpower and equipment. There is no information — and in the 
nature of the case, there can never be sufficient information — on the 
effects of alternative police strategies on the several kinds of crime.”51  
 Policing in this view was also incident-based.  The basic unit of 
analysis was a threatened or completed breach of law or public order.  
Incidents were self-contained.  Success was credited where a threat was 
prevented, or a completed breach was sanctioned, or a dispute was mediated 
to the satisfaction of those involved.  Interventions were confined mainly to 
traditional law-enforcement strategies – interrogations, arrests, warnings, or 
guidance about legal requirements. 
 Internal control and accountability in this regime were weak, and 
external control was highly limited.  The courts held police accountable to 
civil rights norms in the cases that reached them, but these represented only 
a very small fraction of police activity.  In principle, electoral control of 
local government held police accountable, but the political levers – 
appointment of top-level officials and budgetary control – were crude, and 
voters and civilian officials had limited information.  The most salient 
indicators – aggregate measures of crime and disorder – were thought only 
weakly correlated with police efficacy. 
                                                 
50
  James Q. Wilson, cited in note  ; see also Herman Goldstein, Problem-Oriented 
Policing 5-30 (1990). 
51
  Wilson, at 60. 
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 Beginning in the 1980s, the mid-century view was gradually 
repudiated in favor of a post-bureaucratic view.
52
   In this latter view, stable 
top-down rules are supplemented, and in some respects displaced, by more 
flexible norms – notably, plans and indicators.  Plans are more 
comprehensive but more provisional than rules, and indicators measure 
results rather than dictate practice.  The basic unit of analysis in the new 
view is not the incident but the pattern or the problem.  Incidents that claim 
the attention of the police tend to recur at a particular location, harm a 
recurring victim, and/or involve a recurring perpetrator.  These incidents 
often have common causes that call for coordinated responses.  So proactive 
organizations “map” crime incidents to determine where and how they 
should concentrate their efforts.   
 The new view breaks with prior assumptions about discretion.  
While the old view treated discretion as a residual, barely licit category, the 
new one explicitly encourages it.  At the same time, it insists that discretion 
be accountable.  Decisions and strategies are reviewed both before and after 
the fact through various procedures by supervisors, peers, and stakeholders.  
 
 B. Two Trajectories of Reform: Assertive Policing v. Problem-
Oriented Policing 
 As described so far, the proactive view has become a consensus, but 
at this level of generality, it has basic ambiguities.  Recent discussion of 
policing simmers with new concepts.  The range of variation can be most 
usefully illustrated with two contrasting ideal types: Assertive Policing and 
Problem-Oriented Policing.  Both are the subjects of extensive literatures.  
We focus in particular on experiences with Assertive Policing in New York 
from 1993 through 2013 and with Problem-Oriented Policing in Cincinnati 
from 2001 to the present.  We do not offer a comprehensive account of 
either regime, but our contrast captures differences in tone and emphasis.  
Neither city has implemented any single model fully, and both regimes 
contain elements from both our ideal types.   
 Moreover, both New York and Cincinnati are controversial.  New 
York has observed remarkable reductions in crime over more than two 
decades, but the causes of these reductions have been unclear, and the city’s 
style of policing provoked massive political opposition for its effects on 
racial minorities.  The department’s “stop-and-frisk” practice was partially 
enjoined in 2013 by a federal district court and partially repudiated by Bill 
                                                 
52
   See Walker and Archbold, cited in note  , at 1-56. 
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de Blasio during his Mayoral campaign and upon assuming office in 2014.
53
  
Cincinnati has seen substantial crime reductions in recent years, but again, 
the causes remain to be demonstrated.  However, there is evidence that 
police relations with minority communities have improved, and there have 
been some notable local crime-control successes.
54
 
 In broad summary, the Assertive Policing model assumes the 
efficacy of standard interventions, especially stops and arrests.  It uses data 
on crime incidence to rapidly deploy resources to “hot spots” and to hold 
officers down the chain of command accountable for rapid responses to 
crime indicators.  The regime de-emphasizes rules and induces some 
initiative at the precinct command level.  However, like the bureaucracy 
against which it reacts, it remains a principal-agent model of action:  It 
assumes that the principal or senior official can confidently know what 
needs to be done, and the chief organizational problem is inducing 
subordinate agents to execute the plan. 
 By contrast, Problem-Oriented Policing assumes that standard 
responses are typically ineffective even when efficiently directed to high-
crime areas.  It looks for a broader array of patterns than Assertive Policing, 
                                                 
53
 Opinion and Order, Floyd et al. v. City of New York, SDNY 08 Civ. 1034 (Aug. 
12, 2013) (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (hereafter “Floyd liability opinion”); For de Blasio’s campaign 
position, see http://www.billdeblasio.com/issues/crime-fighting-public-safety; for his 
position as Mayor, see Benjamin Weiser and Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York 
Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics (Jan. 31, 2014).  Bratton left as New York chief 
in late 1994.  He subsequently served as chief in Los Angeles and was then re-appointed 
chief in New York in 2013.  His thinking had evolved since his departure and on return he 
distanced himself from the regime in place. 
54
  Robin S. Engel and M. Murat Ozer, Cincinnati Police Department 2014 Crime 
Summary: A Decade in Review (January 9, 2015) (on file with authors) (reporting a 40.5 
percent reduction in violent crimes, a 40.1 reduction in citizen complaints, and 57.3 
reduction in use-of-force incidents from 2004 to 2014); Greg Ridgeway et al. Police-
Community Relations in Cincinnati (Rand Corporation 2009) (reporting improvements in 
popular perceptions of police following court-supervised reforms involving problem-
oriented policing); Cincinnati Police Department, Collaborative Agreement Annual 
Problem Solving Report 2006, available online (reporting some local successes); Robin S. 
Engel, Marie Skubak Tillyer, and Nichola Corsaro, Reducing Gang Violence Using 
Focused Deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), 10 
Justice Quarterly 1080 (2011) (methodologically sophisticated study finding that 
Cincinnati anti-violence initiative has been effective).  Cincinnati has considerably fewer 
police personnel per capita than New York (36.5 per 10,000 versus 60.1 per 10,000) and a 
significantly higher poverty rate (29.4 v. 19.9).  Its department is tiny compared to New 
York’s – about 1,000 as opposed to 35,000 in New York. 
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aspires to analyze them more deeply, and customizes solutions.  Like 
Assertive Policing, POP maps spatially, but it analyzes in more detail and 
views crime occurrences as evidence of environmental and social conditions 
that facilitate crime.  It then tries to devise interventions that disrupt or re-
configure the conditions.  POP also employs a form of pattern analysis that 
focuses on violent people as well as places.  When it identifies persistent 
offenders, it responds with a package of threats, offers of social services, 
and moral exhortation tailored to the specific circumstances of the actors.
55
 
 Problem-Oriented Policing draws on knowledge and encourages 
initiative from both frontline officers and community members.  While 
Assertive Policing tends to emphasize the lines between supervisors and 
beat officers and between the police and the community, POP tends to blur 
them.
56
 
 1. Assertive Policing
57
 
 a. Strategy. Since William Bratton became chief for the first time in 
1993, New York has in both practice and self-presentation emphasized 
Assertive Policing.  As summarized by Franklin Zimring, “the basic 
methodology is trying to take control of potentially threatening situations by 
street stops of suspicious-looking persons, by frisking after stops for 
weapons or contraband, and by making arrests for minor offenses as a way 
to remove perceived risks from the street and to identify persons wanted for 
other crimes.”58 The strategy was initiated with major investments in 
                                                 
55
  This approach to violence is often referred to as “focused deterrence” or “pulling 
levers policing”, but as one of its originators notes, it is best considered an elaboration of 
POP.  David M. Kennedy, Old Wine in New Bottles: Policing and the Lessons of Pulling 
Levers, in Police Innovation 160 (David Weisburd and Anthony Braga, ed.s 2006). 
56
     Assertive Policing resembles what some reformers call “new public 
management.”  See Christopher Hood, The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980s: 
Variations on a Theme, 20 Accounting Organizations and Society 93 (1995).  Problem-
Oriented Policing resembles what others call “experimentalism”.  See Michael Dorf and 
Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Columbia L. Rev. 267 
(1998).  Neither term seems common in the policing field. 
57
  See Jack Maple and Chris Mitchell, The Crime Fighter: Putting the Bad Guys Out 
of Business (1999); Dennis J. Smith and William J. Bratton, Performance Management in 
New York City: Compstat and the Revolution in Police Management in Quicker, Better, 
Cheaper: Managing Performance in American Government 453-82 (Dall W. Forsythe ed. 
2001); Kennedy School of Government, Assertive Policing, Plummeting Crime: The 
NYPD Takes on Crime in New York City (Case Program C16-99-1530 (2001); Eli 
Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing 1999). 
58
  Franklin E. Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban 
Crime Control 118 (2012). 
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Compstat -- information technology that enables prompt identification of 
geographic patterns, or “hot spots.”  Commanders are expected to deploy 
patrol officers promptly to these locations and then to re-deploy them as 
data indicates changes in crime incidence.  The strategy was summarized by 
Jack Maple, Bratton’s principal deputy at the time the regime was 
established, as “cops on dots.”  Maple and others called Chief of Patrol 
Louis Anemone “our Patton” – invoking the World War II general 
associated with mobile tank warfare.
59
 
 The visible presence of police at a hot spot might reduce crime, but 
the Assertive Policing strategy did not rely only on presence.  It prescribed 
confronting and searching people who appeared to be engaged in illegal 
activity, and arresting or citing people for offenses either observed by the 
officers or discovered when suspects were stopped and searched.  Police 
occasionally observed serious offenses, and searches occasionally 
discovered unlicensed guns.  But most arrests and summonses were for 
minor offenses; the largest category involved marijuana use.  The regime 
designers saw such activity as deterring serious crime for various reasons.  
Although it was not part of the official explanation, evidence at the federal 
trial suggested that some officers thought that aggressively confronting 
young men would instill general fear that inhibited criminal activity.  The 
“broken windows” theory formulated by George Kelling and James Q. 
Wilson suggested that “quality-of-life” policing could prevent the 
emergence of hot spots in transitional neighborhoods by encouraging law-
abiding people to act as crime-inhibiting “eyes on the street” and to provide 
information to the police.  Bratton and Maple favored minor-offense 
enforcement in high-crime neighborhoods as a tool that enabled the police 
to put pressure on people they believed but could not prove were engaged in 
more serious offenses.  Prosecution for minor offenses might temporarily 
incapacitate such people; might lead to more intensive surveillance through 
probation, or might induce them to provide intelligence about the criminal 
activities of others.
60
  
 The designers of Assertive Policing emphasized motivation, rather 
than innovation, as the key shortcoming in the prior regime.
61
  Decades of 
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  Maple, at 31, 120; Kennedy School, at 17-21; Bratton and Smith, at 457-62. 
60
  Maple, at  153-56, Kennedy School, at 9-13; Zimring, at 117-31. 
61
 See Maple, cited in note  , at 7 (characterizing the majority of officers on most 
forces as lazy or indolent); Testimony of Joseph Esposito, NYPD Chief of Department 
2000-2013, in Floyd v. City of New York (April 10, 2013) Transcript, at 3020, 3039 
(discussing problems of motivating underperforming officers). 
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complacent management and poor morale had left officers timid and 
indolent.  They needed to be pushed.  Thus, reforming managers used their 
control over promotions to reward the conduct they approved, and they used 
meetings with borough and precinct commanders to publicly honor and 
shame in accordance with their views of performance.
62
  A precinct 
commander won approval by showing mastery of current data about crime 
patters and by quick deployment of officers in response.    
 As long as standard known solutions are adequate, innovation is not 
a priority, and a premise of much of the regime is that the correct response 
is more often than not to increase stops, searches, and arrests.  From 
January 2004 to June 2012, the NYPD documented 4.4 million street stops; 
at the peak in 2011, it made 686,000.  Half of the stops were followed by a 
search for weapons, and 12 percent led to arrests or summons, most for 
minor offenses. 
63
  
 A major performance indicator – perhaps the major performance 
indicator – has been the quantity of stops and related enforcement activity.  
The city denied that there have ever been enforcement quotas for precincts 
or officers either before or after a 2010 ordinance forbidding them.  But 
evidence at trial, including recordings of precinct meetings and surveys of 
officers, indicated that commanders and officers felt strong pressure.  
Moreover, a senior police manager testifying at trial acknowledged that the 
number of stops was one factor in performance assessment.  His main 
qualification was that the department also considered the “quality” of stops, 
which he defined repeatedly as “one that’s in the right place, the right time, 
for the right crime.”64 
  The effect of Assertive Policing on centralization is complex.  The 
key focus of the regime designers was on the precinct commanders.  They 
were subject to more intensive scrutiny from the center, but since this 
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  “One officer [in Lowell, Massachusetts] described Compstat as a forum where 
officers had their ‘balls ripped off’ and surmised that this only served to make individuals 
‘reluctant to speak up … reluctant to do their job.’”  James J. Willis et al, Compstat and 
Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department 15 (Police Foundation 2003).  
Some assert that such pressures have led to cheating on reports.  E.g., John Eterno and Eli 
Silverman, The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation (2012) 
63
  Floyd Liability Opinion, at 31-34.    
64
  Esposito testimony, at 2983; Floyd Liability Opinion, cited in note   , at 64-89.  
Following the court’s ruling, William Bratton, having resumed the role of chief, 
acknowledged that under his predecessor officers were “pushed hard” to increase stops and 
frisks.  Pervaiz Shallwani and Sean Gardiner, NYPD Officers ‘Pushed” on Stop-and-Frisk: 
Police Commissioner Bratton, Wall Street Journal (January 30, 2014). 
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scrutiny was focused on results, it left them discretion with respect to 
tactics.  As we’ve noted, however, the pressure to show immediate response 
to crime rate increases and the presumption that the appropriate response 
was to stop-search-arrest meant commanders had less discretion in practice 
than in theory.  It appears that commanders did not encourage initiative on 
the part of frontline officers.
65
 Bratton stated that creativity should not be 
expected from patrol officers, who tend to be inexperienced and untrained 
in the relevant skills.
66
 
 Finally, Assertive Policing rejected more ambitious versions of 
“community policing”, a philosophy that emphasized development of deep 
local knowledge and active engagement with local leaders, residents, and 
business owners.  Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who brought on Bratton to 
inaugurate Compstat, had dismissed such views as “social work,” a term 
that for him connoted timidity and sentimentality.  Bratton had a more 
developed critique.  In addition to his skepticism about the capacities of 
patrol officers, he doubted that community activists were meaningfully 
representative of their communities or had much information to contribute 
that could not be gathered through conventional investigatory or data 
mining techniques. The original Kelling-Wilson “broken windows” idea 
emphasized the contribution of law-abiding residents to crime control 
through informal pressures.  However, Bratton’s and Maple’s re-
interpretation of it saw minor-offense enforcement mainly as leverage for 
the police over serious wrong-doers, who were assumed to be diffused 
throughout the community.
67
 
 b. Limitations.  Despite the phenomenal declines in major crimes in 
New York, reservations about Assertive Policing have become prominent. 
Two limitations are especially important. 
 First, the preoccupation with static efficiency – moving police to hot 
spots -- led to unreflective reliance on a narrow set of interventions.  
Officers were not encouraged to innovate, and indeed, the emphasis on 
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  A survey by the Police Foundation of Compstat nationwide found that most 
frontline officers were not familiar with Compstat data and were “rarely called upon to 
explain a particular decision“.  David Weisburd, et al., Changing Everything So That 
Everything Can Remain the Same: Compstat and American Policing in Police Innovation, 
cited above in note     , at 291. 
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  Kennedy School, at 9-10. 
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  Smith and Bratton, cited in note  , at 466-72;  Kennedy School, cited in note   , at 
9-10.  See Human Rights Watch, A Red Herring: Marijuana Arrestees Do Not Become 
Violent Felons 14-15 (2012) (quoting officials and commentators asserting that marijuana 
arrests contribute to declines in serious crime).   
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immediate response may have inhibited impulses to do so.  The most 
detailed account to date of Compstat implementation – a study of the 
Lowell, Massachusetts program modeled on New York’s -- reports, 
“Compstat’s data orientation did seem to affect … when and where 
responses would be mobilized, but it had generally done little to stimulate 
analysis of how to actually respond on the basis of the data.”68    
 Performance measures may have been too coarse for meaningful 
assessment of practice. Lacking the ability to compare different 
interventions within the city and uninterested in efforts elsewhere, the City 
tended to measure efficacy solely in terms of crime rate declines.  Although 
“relentless follow-up” was an espoused principle of Assertive Policing,69 
that notion appears to have meant, at best, observation of whether crime 
rates declined following intervention, and at worst, observation to confirm 
that stop-and-frisk practices were being implemented without any regard to 
their efficacy.  Although crime declines were dramatic, their relation to 
Assertive Policing practices is ambiguous.  Crime rates do not seem to have 
been responsive to any fine-grained measure of changes in enforcement 
practice.  Trends do not seem to have been strongly affected either by the 
dramatic increase in stop-and-frisk activity from 2004 to 2011 or its 
dramatic decrease in 2012 (probably in response to the lawsuit and political 
protest).  Moreover, the department’s claims for the efficacy of stop-and-
frisk omit many relevant variables, including “a significant increase in the 
New York City police force, a general shift in drug use from crack cocaine 
to heroin, new computerized tracking systems that speed up police response 
to crime, favorable economic conditions in the 1990s, a dip in the number 
of eighteen to twenty-four-year-old males, an increase in the number of 
offenders currently incarcerated in city jails and state prisons, the arrest of 
several big drug gangs in New York, and possible changes in adolescent 
behavior.”70   
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  Willis et al, cited in note, at 48.  The Police Foundation study of Compstat 
implementation nationwide found that “[t]he vast majority of problem-solving approaches 
identified in these model Compstat agencies relied on traditional police strategies that had 
been used before….” David Weisburd et al, Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and 
Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing, 2 Criminology and Public Policy 421, 
448 (2003). 
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 Maple, at 32. 
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  Bernard Harcourt, Illusions of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows 
Policing 94 (2001).  See also Zimring, at 131-50, who finds that the practice of quickly 
deploying officers to “hot spots” probably had a significant impact, but like Harcourt, finds 
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 Second, the Compstat metrics took little or no account of the costs 
of the stop-and-frisk practices.  Three sorts of costs now seem especially 
important.  There are the costs of unlawful stops – stops that do not meet 
constitutional standards.
71
  The federal district court emphasized the City’s 
failure to make serious effort to monitor these costs.  Second, there are the 
costs of stops that are lawful (because there was reasonable suspicion) but 
that fail to produce evidence of unlawful activity.
72
  Most of these stops 
cause at least inconvenience and often anxiety and humiliation to law-
abiding people.  And finally, there are the costs of minor-offense 
enforcement to the people charged and to their families and communities.
73
 
 The legal status of the second and third categories of costs is 
ambiguous, but they have come to be viewed as important by a large 
fraction of New Yorkers.  Stops and minor-offense enforcement, even on 
otherwise adequate grounds, are especially resented because they are 
disproportionately directed at minority groups.  Many now assert that the 
costs of minor-offense enforcement are especially large.  Most of post-stop 
enforcement action involved offenses such as marijuana or alcohol 
consumption, trespass, or non-threatening forms of disorderly conduct.  
These offenses are not regarded as serious in themselves, but each 
enforcement action creates a record that increases the likelihood that the 
subject will receive subsequent and harsher attention from the criminal 
                                                                                                                            
policing” often blur the distinction between Assertive and Problem-Oriented Policing, both 
of which emphasize deployment on the basis of spatial patterns.  However, a recent meta-
analysis that takes some account of differences in strategic frameworks concludes that 
“problem-oriented policing interventions generate larger mean effect sizes when compared 
to interventions that simply increase levels of traditional police actions in crime hot spots.”  
Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos, and David M. Hureau, The Effects of Hot 
Spots Policing on Crime, 31 Justice Quarterly 633 (2014) 
71
  The Floyd court found on the basis of a study of records by Jeffrey Fagan that “at 
least 200,000 stops [out of 4.4 million between 2004 and 2012] were made without 
reasonable suspicion” and that the “actual number…was likely far higher”.  Floyd Liability 
Opinion, at 7-8. 
72
  At least 88 percent of the stops failed to produce evidence of unlawful activity.  
The remaining 12 percent resulted in arrests or “summonses” (for minor violations that do 
not warrant taking the person into custody), but it seems likely that many of these people 
were not engaged in unlawful activity.  In some years, nearly half of the charges were 
dismissed or adjourned in contemplation of dismissal.  New York State Office of the 
Attorney General, A Report on Arrests Arising from the New York City Police 
Department’s Stop-and-Frisk Practices 8-9, 22-23 (Nov. 2013). 
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 “[O]nly 1.5 percent of stops between 2009 and 2012 resulted in a jail or prison 
sentence of any duration.”  Id., at 10. 
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justice system, and many create public records that will impair his 
employment and housing prospects.   
 A strategy of policing minor misconduct in high-crime 
neighborhoods, even if implemented solely on the basis of non-racial 
indications of misconduct, will disproportionately affect minorities because 
they live disproportionately in high-crime areas.  Minority neighborhoods 
may benefit from reduced crime, but they will suffer to the extent that law-
abiding residents find the life chances of their friends and family members 
cumulatively impaired by repeated police encounters triggered by minor 
misconduct.  There is a growing sense that the criminalization of low-
income minority youth – especially young black men – is a major social 
crisis.
74
  The department ignores these costs.  Indeed it has treated arrests 
and summonses even for minor offenses as measures of success. 
 2. Problem-Oriented Policing 
 a. Strategy.
75
  Although the idea of Problem-Oriented Policing 
antedates Assertive Policing by some years, no jurisdiction has 
implemented Problem-Oriented Policing with the degree of ambition and 
comprehensiveness with which New York implemented Assertive Policing.  
The problem-oriented approach is promoted and supported by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and a national Center for Problem-Oriented Policing.  
Several empirical studies have shown at least modest benefits from many 
problem-oriented initiatives.
76
  The approach has been embraced by many 
departments, but rarely as a basis for re-organizing its core operations.  And 
many initiatives have proved fragile, falling victim to budget cutbacks and 
senior management turnover. 
  Such fragility can be observed in Cincinnati.  The city adopted 
Problem-Oriented Policing in 2002 as part of a “Collaborative Agreement” 
settling one of two lawsuits challenging its use-of-force practices as 
unconstitutionally arbitrary and discriminatory.  The implementation 
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  See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of 
Colorblindness (2010). 
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  See generally Herman J. Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing (1990); Michael S. 
Scott and Stuart Kirby, Implementing POP: Leading, Structuring, and Managing a 
Problem-Oriented Police Agency (Center for Problem Oriented Policing (2012). 
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  David Weisburd et al, The Effects of Problem-Oriented Policing on Crime and 
Disorder (Campbell Foundation 2008) (meta-analysis of POP studies concluding that they 
show modest gains); Braga et al., cited in note   , at 24 (meta-analysis of “hot spots” 
policing studies concluding that they show significant gains in the aggregate and generally 
larger gains for problem-oriented interventions). 
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process was rocky,
77
 but when the agreement terminated in 2008, the court-
appointed monitor reported that problem-solving had been strongly 
institutionalized.  Some ground was lost subsequently due to fiscal cutbacks 
and managerial turnover, but a chief appointed in 2013 has encouraged 
efforts to revivify POP.  The current district commanders have expressed 
commitment to it.  On a brief visit in 2014, we found officers at many levels 
articulate and enthusiastic about problem-oriented policing.
78
   
 Cincinnati, like most cities, shows some influence of Compstat.  The 
district commanders meet with the chief and senior staff weekly and review 
current crime data. They use the crime mapping techniques developed by 
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     Among the problems: One of the two organizational plaintiffs withdrew from the 
settlement after adopting a more confrontational stance toward the City.  The Community 
Partnering Center created to coordinate community involvement in problem-solving 
dissolved when some leaders opted for aggressive protest tactics at the expense of problem-
solving efforts.  Shortly after the settlement, gang-related violence spiked and prompted the 
city to adopt Assertive-Policing-type stop-and-frisk practices for a time.   
78
  John Eck and Jay Rothman, Police Community Conflict and Crime Prevention in 
Cincinnati, Ohio in Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas 225-37 (John 
Bailey and Lucia Dammert ed.s 2006); Saul Green, Monitor’s Transition Year Report on 
the Collaborative Agreement Between the Plaintiff’s and the City of Cincinnati (July 11, 
2008).  We have also relied on Ted Wojcick, Problem-Oriented Policing in Cincinnati: An 
Update (Yale Law School, 2015) (on file with authors), which is based on interviews 
conducted in the spring of 2015. 
 The robustness of POP despite turmoil in the upper reaches of the department and 
its political surroundings is explained in significant measure by the institutional spaces that 
the settlement afforded younger officers attracted to innovative police responses and the 
career opportunities it opened to those who proved adept at developing them. Several in the 
cohort of officers who came of age under the settlement are now in or rising to senior 
positions and provide critical support for POP.   
 In addition, at least one segment of the Cincinnati regime has been strongly 
institutionalized.  This is the gang-focused intervention called the Cincinnati Initiative to 
Reduce Violence (CIRV).  When inaugurated, it produced short-term success, but the 
effects were not sustained – a common experience with initiatives of this kind.  The City 
concluded that implementation had suffered from over-dependence on specific personnel 
and informal relations.  It thus undertook a thoroughgoing re-organization.  The resulting 
structure has an executive director who reports to a committee consisting of the Mayor and 
two other city-wide officials.  Three multi-agency task forces formulate strategies and 
revise them continuously on the basis of data produced by a monitoring committee. Marie 
Tillyer, Robin S. Engel, and Brian Lovins, Beyond Boston: Applying Theory to Understand 
and Address Sustainability Issues in Focused Deterrence Initiatives for Violence 
Reduction, 58 Crime and Delinquency 973 (2012) (analyzing the re-organization of CIRV). 
35 
 
Compstat.
79
  Yet, many officers distinguish their approach from New 
York’s.  In the first place, there is a strong rhetorical influence on 
innovation and creativity.  The Collaborative Agreement that mandated 
POP proclaimed as its core tenet that “problems are dilemmas to be 
engaged and learned from.” In particular, there is an explicit repudiation of 
the idea that confrontation and arrests should be the presumptive responses.  
“A law enforcement response is always a possibility, but may not be 
required. Rather, a range of options is explored….”80 On our visit, we 
frequently heard officers say, “We couldn’t arrest our way out of this 
problem.”   Examples of problems for which arrest is thought usually 
ineffective are street prostitution and retail drug markets.  As long as 
environmental conditions remain unaltered, new recruits will take the place 
of those arrested or those arrested will return when released.   
 Cincinnati POP proponents reject aggressive indiscriminate “zero 
tolerance” or “broken windows” enforcement.  The department responded 
to a spike in murders in 2006 with Operation Vortex, which included 
practices resembling New York’s stop-and-frisk ones, but abandoned them 
the following year.  Lt. Colonel James Whalen, who commanded Operation 
Vortex, told a reporter that he had concluded that indiscriminately 
confrontational approaches were “bullshit”: “Even in high crime 
neighborhoods, there are a lot of honest people living there.  Meanwhile, the 
real bad guys – they know a sweep is on, so they stay inside until things 
cool off.”81  Where arrests are part of a problem-oriented strategy, they are 
used as last resort and applied in as precisely targeted a way as possible.  In 
pointing to data supporting the effectiveness of the Cincinnati Initiative to 
Reduce Violence (CIRV), the initiative that succeeded Operation Vortex, 
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  An example of a project that combines creativity with Compstat-style static 
efficiency concerns involves the overlay of geographical data on traffic citations with 
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2014). 
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  In re Cincinnati Policing, Collaborative Agreement (Case No. 1-99-317) 
(S.D.Ohio, W.D. 2002), at 2,6. 
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  Quoted in John Seabrook, Don’t Shoot: A Radical Approach to the Problem of 
Gang Violence, The New Yorker (June 22, 2009).  His successor as Vortex commander, 
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On Operation Vortex, see David M. Kennedy, Don’t Shoot: One Man, A Street Fellowship, 
and the End of Violence in Inner-City America 232-66 (2011). 
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Captain Maris Herald said, “the results are particularly impressive because 
they were achieved with so few arrests.”82 
 The intellectual core of problem-oriented practice is a discipline 
specifically mandated by the Collaborative Agreement called SARA – for 
Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment.   It begins with a precise 
definition of a problem, proceeds to look for well-configured interventions, 
implements them, assesses the results, and then if the problem persists, 
begins the cycle anew with a revised account of the problem in the light of 
experience. 
 POP emphasizes the potential complexity of both problems and 
interventions.  Illustrations are given in in a series of more than 70 problem-
specific guides produced by the national Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing, for example, “Assaults in and Around Bars,” “Disorder at Day 
Laborer Sites”, and “Shoplifting”.  The guide on “Street Prostitution” 
explains that the “problem” associated with prostitution could be the 
exploitation of the prostitutes by their pimps, or harm to minors, or 
sexually-transmitted disease, or the impact of street solicitation on 
neighborhood atmosphere, or exploitation of customers (notably, by 
robbery).  Each interpretation implies a different set of interventions, and 
the problem often turns out to have many facets and require interventions 
with multiple prongs.
83
 
 In general, problems tend to emerge in two sorts of patterns.  One 
involves recurring criminal incidents at a common location.  The other 
involves recurring lawlessness by a single person or group.
84
 
 Locational analysis in POP involves a thicker sort of mapping than 
Compstat.  It includes considerations of social influence and economic 
interdependence as well as geographical incidence.
85
  One set of strategies 
for problems identified in this manner is Crime Prevention Through 
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  Michael S. Scott and Kelly Dedel, Street Prostitution (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
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producing the data).  Spatial mapping in Assertive Policing is typically based on 
jurisdictional boundaries or abstract statistical properties.  See John Eck et al., Mapping 
Crime: Understanding Hot Spots (National Institute of Justice 2005). 
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Environmental Design.  Interventions of this kind could involve enhancing 
visibility by altering landscaping or improving lighting.  Others aim to 
make the locale less attractive or convenient for undesirable activities.  One 
part of a plan used to disrupt an open-air drug market in the Kennedy 
Heights section of Cincinnati was the attachment egg-shaped structures to a 
bridge siding, making it uncomfortable to sit there.  Fencing below the 
bridge made that space unavailable for hiding drugs.
86
  Markets for drugs or 
prostitution can sometimes be disrupted by re-routing traffic, for example, 
by making the route from the highway to a local street corner more 
circuitous.  The police counsel shop owners on ways to display their 
merchandise that inhibit shoplifting.   
 Strategies for ongoing criminal activity are often coordinated with 
regulation of real-property use.  Where rental properties are used as bases 
for drug-dealing or prostitution, the police may pressure the landlord to 
evict the wrongdoers.  Where neglected or abandoned property is attracting 
criminal activity, the police may induce building code or public nuisance 
enforcement to force the owner to improve conditions, or in extreme cases, 
to forfeit the building.
87
  The department has an education program to help 
landlords with a variety of problems, but especially screening prospective 
tenants for illegal activity and identifying and responding to such activity 
when it occurs.  Empty buildings have unhealthy neighborhood effects, 
including attracting crime; so the department tries to work with developers 
to stabilize or renovate buildings critical to its public safety strategies.  
District 3 recently developed a strategy of this kind for the East and Lower 
Price Hill neighborhoods in collaboration with neighborhood activists, the 
city building and health departments, and the Port of Cincinnati.
88
 
 Liquor law enforcement is also used strategically.  Bars associated 
with public drunkenness are likely to be threatened with loss of their liquor 
licenses if they do not become more careful about refusing to serve 
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  2006 Problem Solving Report, at    
87
  Strategies of this kind are used in many cities, including New York.  Building and 
liquor law enforcement are the principal non-confrontational strategies commonly 
mentioned in the Compstat literature. 
88
  For a more extensive account of a highly-regarded POP initiative that combined 
policing and economic development, see the report by Kansas City’s police chief of the 
city’s response to disorder at day labor hiring sites.  The city and local stakeholder groups 
organized and built a center that provides services to workers and employers while 
regulating the hiring process in ways that limit traffic disruption and criminal activity. See 
James Corwin, Day Laborers: Improving the Quality of Life for Laborers, Employers, and 
Neighbors, 73 The Police Chief (April 2006). 
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intoxicated patrons.  One initiative mitigated a problem of chronic 
disorderly behavior at a particular street corner by persuading a local 
convenience store to stop selling beer in 40-ounce containers.    
 The most prominent responses to problems defined in terms of 
offenders, as opposed to places, are developed through CIRV.
89
 CIRV 
begins with an effort to identify violent offenders and their social networks.  
Its strategies emphasize four basic elements: credible threats directed to 
recurrent law-breakers of harsh sanctions in the event of further violence, 
efforts to mobilize peer pressures by threatening sanctions against the group 
if any member offends, moral exhortation by community leaders, and offers 
of social services to help with medical or psychological problems or to 
improve access to employment.  The most distinctive practice of this 
approach is the “call in”.  Gang members are “invited” (for those on 
probation or parole, the invitation is mandatory) to meetings where teams of 
police, prosecutors, community leaders, and social service providers deliver 
the combination of threats, exhortations, and offers of help. 
 Proponents of this approach emphasize that, to be credible, the 
threats must be targeted carefully on known wrongdoers, and ideally, 
accompanied by demonstrations that the authorities have enough evidence 
now to prosecute them for past misdeeds should they re-offend.  (The teams 
sometimes show videotapes at the call-ins of audience members engaged in 
drug dealing or vandalism.)  One reason why targeted threats are more 
credible then generalized ones is that offenders know that authorities do not 
have the resources to follow through on the latter.  But they can follow 
through on targeted threats, and of course, to maintain credibility, they must 
do so.  Thus, arrest and prosecution, sometimes for minor offenses, is a key 
part of CIRV, but they are used only as a last resort and only against the 
persistently violent. 
 The basic POP model prescribes that, after the initial intervention is 
deployed, its efficacy be assessed and, if necessary, the intervention re-
calibrated.  In principle, a good initial plan should specify measures of 
efficacy, though these may have to be revised as understanding of the 
problem changes.  Crime reports and calls for service are usually key 
measures, but others, including customized ones, are feasible.   
 The most systematic assessments have been performed in 
connection with CIRV.  They have shown at least modest success, 
measured by gang-related violent incidents with appropriate controls.  But 
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they also raised questions about the effectiveness of particular practices.  
Social services have been a particular concern.  When indicators suggested 
services were not contributing to the reductions in violence, the program 
adjusted.  It intensified service monitoring through a multi-agency 
committee that meets monthly.  And it re-configured the menu of services, 
focusing less on job readiness and more on psychological issues such as 
anger management or interpersonal coping.  It also sought to target the 
offers more precisely on individuals with strong propensities to violence.
90
  
 The problem-oriented approach pushes Cincinnati toward a more 
decentralized administration than New York-style Assertive Policing.  The 
design of contextual strategies depends on information from beat officers 
and local residents, whom David M. Kennedy emphasizes, “know who is in 
what street groups, and who is fighting with whom; what last years’ 
antecedent to yesterday’s shooting was; who is committing the drug 
robberies that are not even being reported to the police; who is selling drugs 
on the corners; what mid-level dealer is running the crack house operated 
only by juveniles; what turf is claimed by which groups and who is allowed 
there and who is not; which domestic violence offenders are currently 
dangerous to what women.” Kennedy notes that other policing regimes 
“generally make little use of this frontline knowledge, partly because it is 
often of no use in making cases – an unreported drug robbery, to take a 
particularly clear example, cannot be prosecuted – and partly because … 
top-down management” inhibits access to it.91 
 The precise allocation of responsibility among different levels of 
administration is still a matter of discussion.  All but the most local 
problems require initiative on the part of division commanders or center 
staff.  Yet, a premise of the Collaborative Agreement was that officers at all 
levels should be capable of participating in problem-solving efforts.  Under 
the Agreement, all new recruits were trained in problem-solving methods.  
In principle, problem-solving ability is one of the criteria on which officers 
are evaluated.  Because of fiscal constraints, there were no new recruits 
from 2008 through 2014, and as we’ve noted, the culture of problem-
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 Engel et al., cited in note  ; University of Cincinnati Policing Initiative, 
Implementation of the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, Year 2 Report (November 
1, 2009), at 4-6; see also Anthony A. Braga and David L. Weisburd, The Effects of 
‘Pulling Levers’ Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime (Campbell Collaboration 2012) 
(meta-analysis concluding that nine of ten relevant studies show significant effects for 
“focused deterrence” interventions, though also noting that the studies lack rigor). 
91
  Kennedy, citied in note  ,  at 160. 
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solving has languished in recent years.  Nevertheless, at least some patrol 
officers identify with POP.  This is especially true of the “neighborhood 
officers” with specific local beats.  One such officer recently initiated a 
project to disrupt a local drug market by re-designating some streets as one-
way.  As part of an initiative on cell phone thefts, he drafted and helped 
secure passage of an ordinance requiring pawnshops who accept cell phones 
as collateral to report them to the police.
92
 
 The Collaborative Agreement embodied an ambitious conception of 
community engagement that has not been fully realized but nevertheless 
continues to influence practice.  The agreement was formulated in the 
course of a series of open meetings and roundtables orchestrated by an 
expert in the mediation of civic disputes, and this type of engagement 
continues.  When the current chief, Jeffrey Blackwell, took office in 2013, 
he began his tenure by conducting “town hall” meetings in each of the city’s 
five divisions. 
 In addition to this relatively passive participation, local stakeholders 
often play roles in formulating and implementing specific strategies. The 
department has worked with social service agencies to develop assistance to 
prostitutes open to exploring other means of supporting themselves.  Job-
related services are an important part of the CIRV violence-reduction 
strategy.  Some strategies incorporate efforts to increase the presence of 
law-abiding citizens at strategic times and places.  Community groups may 
agree to turn out members as part of strategies to evict disorderly activity 
from a contested public space.  The department has a Citizens on Patrol 
program in which volunteers observe designated locations and report 
problems.
93
     
 A remark in one of our interviews suggests how the reconception of 
policing promoted by POP parallels and converges with changes in other 
fields.  In discussing his work with a community development organization 
in Cincinnati’s Walnut Hills neighborhood, Captain Daniel Gerard noted 
that he saw similarity between this work and that of a friend serving as an 
army officer in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.  The friend was also 
involved in economic and institutional development efforts.  The 
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  Interview with Officer David Epstein, January 24, 2014. 
93
  Officers have cultivated ties with organized community interlocutors.  The 
District 3 commander sat on the board of the Walnut Hills Redevelopment Foundation.  
Another district commander helped organize and sat on the board of the Faith Community 
Alliance of Greater Cincinnati, a group of clergy, community leaders, and social service 
providers that “serves as a conduit between the community and local government.” 
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implication is that Problem-Oriented Policing more resembles the counter-
insurgency model of warfare associated with General David Patraeus than 
General Patton’s mobile tank tactics invoked by Bratton to explain 
Compstat.  Like POP, the counter-insurgency approach prescribes that 
patrol, response to incidents, and use-of-force be coordinated with diverse 
proactive initiatives that engage civilians with a stake in achieving security.  
The goal is to secure terrain by building a viable community, not by 
attempting to annihilate all potentially hostile forces.  As POP-influenced 
police offers often say “we couldn’t arrest our way out of this problem”, 
David Patraeus reports that he often said in Iraq that “we would not be able 
to kill or capture our way out of” problems there.94 
 b. Limitations.  Since problem-oriented policing has rarely been 
rigorously and comprehensively implemented, it is difficult to separate 
limitations that arise from inadequate implementation from those that are 
inherent in the model.  Nevertheless, looking at the theoretical accounts, we 
find two broad limitations.  They involve ways in which the model is 
incomplete, though perhaps not irremediably so. 
   First, POP’s commitment to multiple and flexible criteria of 
success is both a strength and a weakness.  It facilitates more complex 
responses.  However, it also makes it harder to evaluate success.  Since 
criteria will vary across different initiatives, rigorous comparisons will be 
difficult.  And since criteria are provisional, it may be unclear whether a 
low score reflects the inadequacy of the intervention or the inadequacy of 
the metric.  This problem can be mitigated by incorporating some basic 
standard measures such as crime rates, but moving in this direction 
compromises the ambition to contextualize.  A common response in other 
fields is to adopt modes of evaluation that assess process as well as 
outcomes and employ qualitative as well as quantitative judgments.  For 
example, the “balanced scorecard” used in many fields summarizes both 
quantitative measures and qualitative judgments on both process and 
outcomes.  Process variables in POP would include the quality of problem 
definition, planning, and stakeholder engagement.  The qualitative 
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  David Patraeus, Forward, Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey With David Patraeus 
and the Remaking of the Iraqui Civil War Xxii (2013).  
 Two other Cincinnati officers – Captain Maris Herald, a former social worker, and 
Sgt. Julian Johnson, a former school teacher – compared their practice to social work.  This 
is the same analogy Mayor Giuliani used, but for these officers it had positive rather than 
disparaging connotations.  The positive connotations were associated with the problem-
solving orientation that has long been a central tradition in social work. 
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judgments typically emerge from a peer review process in which outsiders 
with relevant experience audit samples of cases.
95
  Such processes, 
however, are severely underdeveloped in policing. 
 Second, there is no clear model of how local problem-solving efforts 
fit within the larger structure of policing.  Larger structures above the local 
problem level have to deal with three sorts of issues.  They need to collect 
and analyze information about local experiences in forms that permit 
learning.  They need to prioritize problems and allocate resources within the 
jurisdiction.  And they need to coordinate activities across neighborhoods, 
and indeed across cities, states, and nations for problems that reach across 
jurisdictions. POP proponents have made most progress on the first, 
learning-facilitation goal.
 96
  
 In Cincinnati the CIRV re-organization made substantial progress on 
these issues for the violence-reduction programs. The reorganization 
involved sophisticated assessment instruments for both process and 
outcomes, and it produced an explicit and comprehensive organizational 
structure with clearly assigned responsibility for data gathering and re-
assessment.
97
  On the other hand, problem-solving efforts outside of CIRV 
are less systematically coordinated and assessed in Cincinnati.   
  
 IV. Civil Rights and Police Reform 
  
 Post-bureaucratic organization is distinctively responsive to the 
difficulties of second-generation civil rights doctrine.  Those difficulties, 
we’ve seen, include applying the notion of intent to disparate harm that 
results from inattention and applying the notion of reasonableness to 
conduct that is normatively ambiguous.  Post-bureaucratic organization 
responds to these difficulties by insisting on and facilitating self-
consciousness and articulation.  Indeed, much of the literature on 
contemporary organization portrays these qualities, not just as instruments 
to greater productivity, but as intrinsic values that constitute a kind of 
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  See Robert Kaplan and David Norton, The Balanced Scorecard (1998).  We have 
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William H. Simon, Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from 
Child Welfare Reform, 34 Law and Social Inquiry 523  (2009).   
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organizational virtue.
98
  As applied to contemporary civil rights cases, they 
imply a duty to examine rigorously the effects of conduct on civil rights 
values and to resolve ambiguity by articulating provisionally but 
reflectively the organization’s understanding of issues that have not been 
resolved externally.  
 The judicially-induced reforms in New York and Cincinnati 
illustrate the emerging duty of responsible administration.  Their concrete 
directives owe more to norms of administrative practice than to any 
interpretive inferences from substantive equal protection or search-and-
seizure norms.  Yet, the two regimes reflect a basic difference in remedial 
design.   
 The remedial order in New York leaves the city’s core policing 
practices alone.  It adds a set of peripheral compliance routines designed to 
minimize the threat of these core practices to civil-rights values.  The 
Cincinnati Collaborative agreement requires a more comprehensive 
restructuring.  While this holistic approach is unusual in police litigation, it 
is part of a larger class of holistic civil-rights reforms in diverse fields.  
Comprehensive reform sometimes appears more efficient than specialized 
compliance procedures from the perspectives of both civil rights and core 
crime-control goals. 
  
 A. Compliance: New York 
 Because the city did not settle until the case was on appeal, the New 
York lawsuit produced a rare contested judgment.  The trial court was thus 
compelled to address substantive doctrinal concerns, but its remedial order 
is generally consistent with the PTSR approach.  As such, it illustrates both 
the strengths and weaknesses of that approach. 
 Whether the plaintiffs established systemic violations under current 
doctrine is debatable, and the court’s decision would have been vulnerable 
had the appeal gone ahead.
99
  We think the strongest case for the court’s 
decision can be made in terms of a duty of responsible administration. 
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  On self-consciousness, see Fred Kofman, Conscious Business: How to Build 
Value Through Values (2012); and on articulation, see Productivity Press Development 
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  The plaintiffs’ case was extensive, but it rested mainly on four points: (1) On 
discrimination, the plaintiffs introduced evidence of statements by senior officers as direct 
evidence of purposeful discrimination.  (2) As indirect evidence, they introduced a 
sophisticated statistical analysis by our colleague Jeffry Fagan showing large disparities 
between the racial composition of the people stopped, frisked, and arrested and that of the 
residents of the neighborhoods in which the police activity occurred.  (3) On search-and-
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 The evidence showed extensive administrative neglect or 
incompetence with respect to policy-making, supervision, and monitoring 
of civil rights norms:  The City knew that the document it used for many 
years to record stops for civil rights monitoring purposes was inadequate 
but had made no effort to revise it.  It was aware of long-term and 
widespread non-compliance with frontline documentation requirements but 
failed to address it.  It apparently made no use for monitoring purposes of 
the records it had been required to keep under an earlier decree.  Its only 
detailed written policies on racial profiling and the constitutional limits on 
search-and-seizure were in training manuals, and the court found them 
erroneous.  Although the policies prohibited racial profiling in general 
terms, there appeared to be little or no supervisory effort to elaborate or 
enforce them.  The department used the quantity of stops and arrests that an 
officer made as a factor in evaluations, and many officers felt pressure to 
get their numbers up without regard to whether the stops were lawful.  
Although the department recognized that quotas were inappropriate (and 
beginning in 2010, prohibited by city ordinance), it never produced a 
coherent written or oral statement explaining how the quantity of stops 
figured in evaluation.
100
 
 Within the department, discipline for civil rights violations was rare 
in part because the responsible officials, in violation of the department’s 
regulations, rejected all complaints that depended on uncorroborated 
civilian testimony disputed by the officer named in the complaint.  Despite 
numerous claims of systemic racial bias over more than a decade, including 
a 1999 New York Attorney General report, virtually the only rigorous effort 
to monitor equality norms was a 2007 Rand Report.  That report concluded, 
on a basis the court found questionable, that aggregate data did not suggest 
                                                                                                                            
seizure, they introduced testimony about19 stops of which the court found 9 to be unlawful.  
(4) They also offered a study by Fagan concluding on the basis of an examination of the 
department’s records that at least 200,000 of 4.2 million stops between 2004 and 2012 were 
unlawful.   
 An appellate court hewing to the precepts of classicism might have concluded: (1) 
Most of the official statements are too ambiguous to show purposeful discrimination.  (2) 
The statistical study is strong, but it depends on complex and disputed methodology of a 
sort that appellate authority resists in the criminal justice context.  (3) The nine individual 
instances of 4
th
 amendment violation look like the showing that Rizzo held inadequate.  (4) 
The search-and-seizure study is based on sloppily-kept, unreliable records.  (Of course, if 
there is a duty of responsible administration, this latter point is unhelpful to the city.  But 
classical doctrine sometimes rewards administrative laxness.  See note   above.) 
100
  Floyd Liability Opinion, cited in note  , at 60-117. 
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discrimination.  However, it also concluded that outlier data in particular 
localities raised questions that should be investigated, and the department 
failed to follow up on this or other recommendations in the report.
101
 
 In important respects, the court’s remedial order seems more 
directly responsive to these administrative failings than to its findings on 
discriminatory intent or objective unreasonableness.  For the most part, it 
follows the PTSR approach of the consent decrees.
102
 The central remedial 
intervention is the appointment of a monitor “to develop, based on 
consultation with the parties, a set of reforms of the NYPD’s policies, 
training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline regarding stop and 
frisk.”103  The court laid down some specific parameters for documentation 
of stops, and it ordered the department to “experiment” with videotaping by 
body-worn cameras of stops in at least one precinct in each of the five 
boroughs.  In addition, the court appointed a second judicial officer called a 
“Facilitator” to guide a “joint remedial process”  
 The court’s order avoids the danger of judicial micro-management, 
but it does reflect limitations common to PTSR-style remedial practice.  
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  Id., at 61-64, 115-17. 
 Another pertinent indication of managerial irresponsibility not mentioned in the 
court’s opinion is the city’s treatment of information from lawsuits.  Hundreds of lawsuits 
are filed yearly against the police – there were 2,211 filed in fiscal 2006 – but up to the 
time of the time of the stop-and-frisk challenge the department made no managerial use of 
the claims or information developed in the suits.  It did not examine or investigate the facts 
unless the plaintiffs choose to file separate administrative complaints.  It did not record 
judicial claims in the personnel files of the officers named in them.  The law department 
provided almost no information to the police about the claims.  These practices persisted 
for many years despite recommendations by three city comptrollers that the police 
department examine lawsuit claims diagnostically.  Joanna Schwartz, Myths and 
Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 
UCLA L. Rev. 1023, 1045-48 (2010).  The city recently announced an initiative along 
these lines.  Benjamin Weiser, Comptroller Offers Plan to Curb Personal Lawsuits Against 
City, New York Times (July 9, 2014). 
102
  Floyd et al. v. City of New York, Remedial Opinion. 
 Some commenters worry that the process of negotiated settlement subverts public 
control and inappropriately pre-empts the law-declaring function of the courts.  E.g, 
Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights 
of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 189, 238-39 
(1992).  But as New York exemplifies, trial court remedial practices in contested cases are 
likely to parallel practice in settlements.  When they have to prescribe remedies, judges will 
look to remedies in comparable situations rather than trying to derive them formally from 
substantive doctrine. 
103
  Floyd Remedial Opinion, at 12. 
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These limitations reflect the lingering influence of classical doctrinal 
notions. 
 With respect to discrimination, we have noted that under an 
ambitious conception of non-discrimination the defendant has a duty to 
investigate and assess the disproportionate costs its practices impose on 
protected groups and to consider ways in which these harms might be 
mitigated.  However, in the court’s analysis, both the harms and the 
practices in question are defined narrowly. 
 The court is most concerned with the harms to law-abiding minority 
group members.  It does not treat as justiciable, or at least as remediable, 
claims arising from the mass criminalization of young minority men 
through aggressive minor-offense enforcement, even though this harm is 
racially skewed and viewed by many as more serious than the harm to the 
law-abiding.  The court explicitly denies that the city has any duty to 
examine the efficacy of stop-and-frisk as a strategy of controlling severe 
crime or to search for a less harmful alternative.
104
  
 The court’s refusal to take the more ambitious course is consistent 
with the authority that expresses reluctance to draw strong inferences from 
the disparate impacts of wholesale choices about what laws to enforce
105
, 
but it is nevertheless debatable.  What the court sees as a narrower 
intervention – a command to eliminate discrimination from the established 
crime-control approach – may actually prove quite difficult to enforce once 
the city has coached its officers to avoid inculpatory statements and facially 
inadequate documentation.  A more encompassing intervention might have 
been easier in some senses to implement.  It would not, as the court might 
have assumed, require a ban of stop-and-frisk, much less prescription of an 
acceptable alternative.  Rather, it would have required the department to 
expand the self-analysis and stakeholder deliberations the court ordered to 
include a disciplined consideration of alternative crime-control approaches 
to see if there is a comparably effective but less harmful way of achieving 
the city’s goals. 
 With respect to search-and-seizure, we have noted the problem that, 
while Fourth Amendment constitutional duty applies most importantly to 
the city as an institution, doctrine and practice tends to be elaborated from 
the perspective of the individual police officer at the moment of 
intervention.  A strategy using massive arrests for minor offenses as a way 
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of gaining leverage over major offenses and tolerating low hit rates on stops 
implies relative ignorance about the community (other than the location of 
reported crimes).  A department that invests effectively in cultivating useful 
community relations, in aggregating and analyzing intelligence, and in 
facilitating efficient exchange of information among its members may be 
able to target its interventions more precisely.  (New York City claims that 
it does these things, but its rigid commitment to of stop-and-frisk and its 
low hit rates raise doubts about the rigor of its efforts.)   
 For example, when it succeeds, Problem-Oriented Policing makes 
more sparing use of arrests but achieves high hit rates because it is able to 
reliably identify the actors most responsible for community disorder.  Many 
believe that, contrary to the apparent assumptions of some Assertive 
Policing proponents, a very small number of actors are responsible for a 
large fraction of disorder even in the most disordered communities.
106
  To 
the extent this is so, Assertive Policing is a highly inefficient way of 
addressing it.  Arguably, the availability of less harmful alternatives should 
bear on reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, as it does under some 
anti-discrimination and tort doctrines.
107
  Departments using Assertive 
Policing should thus have a duty to examine alternatives, such as POP, and 
to either adopt one or provide credible reasons why it would be less 
satisfactory than current practices.  The court’s insistence that efficacy is 
not in issue removes pressure from the department to question the premises 
of its strategy. 
 In addition, the New York order, consistent with Whren v. US, 
understands Fourth Amendment reasonableness to depend on the extent to 
which evidence supports the officer’s judgment that some law (no matter 
how minor) has been broken, not by the extent to which intervention 
furthers underlying crime-control purposes. Critics object that Whren leaves 
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  For example, in an effort to clean up a severely crime- and drug-ridden 
neighborhood in Austin, Texas, intensive intelligence analysis indicated to the surprise of 
some that there were only seventeen active dealers.  According to one official, “This 
exercise helped officers realize that they may have been directing enforcement action 
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involved in it.”  Kennedy, cited in note   , at 168.  See also Human Rights Watch, cited in 
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  On anti-discrimination, see notes above    ; on tort, see Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability sec, 2(b) (providing that negligence liability for defective products 
depends in substantial part on whether “harm posed by the product could have been 
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arbitrariness unchecked.  Defenders of the case warn of the dangers of a 
standard that turns on the subjective intentions of individual officers.  But 
from our perspective, the key focus of inquiry should be, not the 
subjectivity of the individual officer, but the departmental strategy that the 
officer’s conduct implements.  Can the department show that it has a 
strategy that explains its officers’ practices?  Is it assessing the efficacy of 
these practices in the light of its own experience and those of comparable 
agencies?  If not, then it is violating its duty of responsible administration. 
 The limits of the classic substantive doctrine explain the limits of the 
remedial order, but it is not clear how much the authority requires the 
limits.  Remedial practice has emancipated itself from the constraints of 
classical substantive doctrine to a large extent.   Perhaps it might go further.  
Cincinnati, to which return in the next section, suggests, that under some 
conditions, it could. 
 
 B. The Holistic Approach 
 1.  Limits of Specialized Reform.  Sometimes the most effective way 
to vindicate civil rights values is to change the institution’s core practices, 
and sometimes institutions can be persuaded or induced to undertake such 
far-reaching changes because they turn out to be less costly than peripheral 
ones.   
 There are two general reasons why comprehensive reform may 
prove more effective.  First, compliance procedures added to unreformed 
core processes may prove too weak to affect practice or may generate costly 
friction.  Power, honor, and reward in an organization tend to go to those 
who excel at attaining core goals.  Commands that impede the attainment of 
core goals may be perceived as illegitimate or hypocritical, and those 
charged with enforcing them, as scolds or snitches.  Reforms that reduce the 
tension between core goals and civil-rights norms can reduce such 
difficulties. 
 For example, many American producers of consumer products 
commit to induce their foreign suppliers to comply with international labor 
standards. The track record of these efforts, despite the good faith of most 
monitors and substantial investments by many producers, has been poor.  
Monitors find it hard to get information on remote, globally dispersed 
operations, and they have only weak influence over the producers’ sub-
contracting decisions.  Yet, some observers see promise in a recent initiative 
by Nike, the sports apparel producer, to shift its foreign suppliers’ core 
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manufacturing to “lean production.”108  Lean production is attractive to 
global producers because it enables them to respond more quickly to 
changes in demand.  Going lean requires extensive worker training, and 
such an investment tends to make the workers valuable assets.  A rigorous 
analysis of Nike labor-standard audit records shows that sub-contractors in 
the program that successfully move to lean production have dramatically 
better records than their traditional peers on such important matters as 
minimum wages, abuse of overtime, and underage labor.
109
 
 A second reason why specialized intervention may fail is that poor 
respect for civil rights may be a symptom of broader organizational 
dysfunction.  Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres suggest that evidence of civil-
rights violations is often a kind of “miner’s canary” that signals more 
pervasive pathology.
110
  Efforts to reform a discrete piece of a generally 
failing organization may be thwarted by surrounding pathology.  In such 
situations, it may turn out that comprehensive change can serve other 
institutional goals as well as civil rights.   
 Efforts to address race discrimination in juvenile justice provide an 
illustration.  Minority youth are over-represented at every stage of the 
criminal justice process, including especially incarceration.  1992 and 2002 
amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 
mandate that juvenile justice officials proactively address “disproportionate 
minority contacts”.  They must measure and report on racial incidence, 
develop plans to mitigate disproportionate effects, and periodically re-assess 
these plans.  The Department of Justice and the Annie E. Casey Foundation 
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have developed a national structure that provides technical assistance and 
facilitates peer exchanges among state and local governments.
111
 
 The dominant strategy that has emerged among the participants in 
the Casey Foundation network is a reform of the entire detention process.  
A key element involves the replacement of informal probation-officer 
judgments at the entry stage with a risk assessment instrument that dictates 
decisions on the basis of numerical scores for key variables.  The 
instruments are constructed through statistical analysis of past experience to 
determine what indicators predict re-offense or failure to appear at hearing.  
Scores can be over-ridden but only with supervisory approval, and the over-
rides are periodically reviewed to see if they indicate a need for changes in 
the instrument.   
 The reforms have been associated with large reductions in the 
percentage of youth of all races detained.  Although aggregate racial 
disparities have not changed much, there have been notable local 
reductions, and youth of color have benefitted greatly from the aggregate 
detention reductions.  So far, the story seems a striking example of the 
“miner’s canary” idea that racial disparities can signal a more general 
problem.  For our purposes, the key point is that the reformers plausibly 
concluded that the most effective way to vindicate civil-rights was to reform 
the institution’s core processes, rather than to add a specialized compliance 
function.
112
  
 b. Problem-Oriented Policing as a Civil Rights Remedy: Cincinnati.   
Many police regimes that have been subject to structural challenges involve 
one or both of the conditions that favor holistic intervention.  Their crime 
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  42 USC 12112(b)(5)(A).  See Johnson, cited in note   ; Sabel and Simon, cited in 
note    , at 21-27.  
112
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control strategies depend on street confrontations based on overbroad and 
racially inflected criteria.  These strategies are constitutionally 
problematical even where they are effective
113
, and officers tend to believe 
they are effective more than they are.  Thus, specialized civil-rights 
remediation is likely to generate friction by inhibiting what officers 
consider their core functions.  Moreover, the insufficient attention to civil-
rights values in these regimes is often symptomatic of more general 
administrative underdevelopment and dysfunction.    
 Cincinnati illustrates the possibility of litigation-induced holistic 
reform.  The City entered two agreements to reform its police department in 
2002.  One was with the Department of Justice, which initiated an 
investigation at the invitation of the Mayor in the aftermath of civil unrest 
over a fatal police shooting of an unarmed man.  The other was 
“Collaborative Agreement” settling a lawsuit alleging racially biased 
policing brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, a local advocacy 
group called the Black United Front, and some individuals.
114
   
 The Department of Justice agreement and part of the Collaborative 
Agreement focused on familiar PTSR measures.  Yet, the most extensive 
provisions of the Collaborative Agreement prescribed uniquely ambitious 
reform.  “The City”, the decree proclaimed, “shall adopt problem-oriented 
policing as the principal strategy for addressing crime and disorder 
problems.”115 
 A prefatory “Value Statement” asserts that problem-oriented 
policing “frames the overall philosophy and practices” of the agreement.  
More specifically, the City agrees that “[i]nitiatives to resolve crime and 
disorder shall be preceded by careful problem, definition, analysis, and an 
examination of a broad range of solutions.”  Further, the police must 
“routinely re-evaluate implemented solutions.”  The agreement adds, “A 
law enforcement response is always a possibility, but may not be required.”  
The agreement recites that every Cincinnati officer has received at least 
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eight-hours of training in the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, 
Assessment) methodology.
116
 
 It further sets out administrative procedures designed to create a 
“continuous learning process.”  The City will develop a “system…to enable 
the tracking of repeat offenders, repeat victims, and repeat locations that are 
essential to problem oriented policing.”  The system must enable the 
“tracking” of problems so that progress can be ascertained and so that 
officers can identify interventions that may have useful lessons for related 
or similar problems.  The city committed to examine practices in other 
jurisdictions and maintain a “library of best practices.”117 
 And the city committed to develop “ongoing community dialog and 
interaction”.  In addition to the complaint and monitoring processes, the 
agreement provided for “periodic surveys” of samples of both citizens and 
police officers on the views of police citizen relations. 
118
  
 The agreement implicitly rejects the premise of substantive Fourth 
Amendment doctrine that probable cause for a stop or arrest establishes its 
reasonableness.  The SARA process assesses reasonableness of measures in 
terms of the broader problem-solving plan that the action implements.  At 
the same time, the agreement is emphatic in rejecting intent as a touchstone.  
A “central” premise is that “blame is an obstacle to progress.”  Blaming, the 
document asserts, distracts attention from the common interests different 
groups share and from the search for mutually beneficial practices.
119
  The 
implication is that the racially disproportionate harm from the City’s 
policing practices results, not from intent, but from indifference or 
ignorance and that the appropriate remedy is to re-align, not incentives, but 
attention, and to induce learning. 
 The Collaborative Agreement has run its term (initially five years, 
extended to six), but as we have seen, it continues to influence practice in 
Cincinnati, albeit incompletely.  Some citizens and officers continue to refer 
to “the Collaborative” as an ongoing institution. 
 The embrace of problem-oriented policing as a civil rights remedy is 
partly due to some historical accidents.
120
   However, the appeal of POP as a 
                                                 
116
  Id., at par.s 2, 20-24. 
117
  Id., at par.s 29c, 29p, 29b.  Observation on our visit in January 2014 suggested 
that implementation of these provisions had fallen off. 
118
  Id., at par.s 29f, 34. 
119
  Id., at par. 2. 
120
  The negotiations took place in an atmosphere of crisis in which the City had been 
roiled by shocking shootings of both an unarmed civilian and three police officers.  To the 
53 
 
civil rights remedy rests on broader considerations.   POP potentially 
facilitates better-informed and more nuanced decisions that affect civil-
rights values.  In particular, it has the potential to reduce the need for 
imprecisely targeted coercive interventions that threaten both Fourth 
Amendment and Equal Protection values.  With respect to discrimination, 
POP encourages a more continuous and localized assessment of 
disproportionate harm to protected groups and search for less harmful 
alternatives.  With respect to search-and-seizure, it potentially facilitates 
more focused strategies for controlling serious crimes that rely less on 
vague and overbroad criteria for intervention.  POP respects the injunction 
of Terry v. Ohio
121
 that police confrontation be based on reasonable 
“individualized” suspicion.  It intervenes more selectively and with a richer 
information base than Assertive Policing.  In addition, it strives for kind of 
accountability that the Whren court considered infeasible.  It asks offices to 
justify their decisions, not just in terms of whether some law has been 
broken in a particular situation, but in terms of a broader crime-control 
strategy.   
 At the same time, POP extends the transparency and reasonable-
explanation themes of the duty of responsible administration.  It provides 
explanations of police conduct that are accessible at the local community 
level.  As it enables the police to profit from stakeholder knowledge, it 
enables stakeholders to better assess conduct both for general efficacy and 
for compliance with civil-rights norms.  It encourages citizen involvement, 
not just as sources of information, but as active participants who have 
something to contribute to the efficacy of the strategy.   
 We do not suggest that Cincinnati’s approach is constitutionally 
mandatory.  Even if relevant doctrine is understood to entail disciplined 
analysis of harms and alternatives, there may be many ways of 
institutionalizing these practices effectively.  It is possible that a more 
centralized and standardized regime might do so.  But POP seems more 
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directly responsive to the challenges of the emerging duty of responsible 
administration than any version of Assertive Policing established to date.
122
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Second-generation civil rights problems resist substantive 
regulation.  Thus, doctrine has focused increasingly on the structures and 
practices that give content to official discretion.  At its most effective, 
intervention has encouraged post-bureaucratic trends that minimize the 
kinds of unreflectiveness and ambiguity that give rise to second-generation 
problems. 
 Yet, as developments in policing show with particular clarity, post-
bureaucratic organization takes markedly different forms with 
correspondingly different implications for accountability.  At one extreme, 
exemplified by Aggressive Policing in New York, the organization focuses 
on identifying high-crime locales and rapidly mobilizing a limited set of 
conventional interventions within them.  It decentralizes only to the extent 
necessary to speed redeployment of forces.  At the other extreme, 
exemplified by POP as practiced in Cincinnati, the organization aims to 
make its interventions at once more effective and more precisely targeted by 
tailoring interventions to particular contexts – physical environments or 
social networks. To acquire the necessary information, initative is 
decentralized to the lower ranks, and the department collaborates with the 
community at many levels. 
These differences in strategy matter for accountability. The 
strategies shape the nature and determine the frequency of the situations 
under which police may put constitutional values most sharply at risk.  
Strategies such as POP that strive to distinguish wrongdoers from others in 
the neighborhood, to concentrate on precisely identified crimogenic 
locations, and to enlist community support are less likely to produce 
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constitutionally risky confrontations than are strategies like Aggressive 
Policing.  
We do not suggest that Cincinnati’s approach is constitutionally 
mandatory.  It is possible that a more centralized and standardized regime 
might achieve equivalent, or better performance.  The role of the court or 
the supervisory agency like the DOJ under a duty of responsible 
administration is not to prescribe solutions. Rather, it is to induce entities 
that have violated constitutional norms to undertake disciplined self-
analysis of the extent and underlying causes of the harms they have caused 
and a painstaking search for less burdensome alternatives.   
Although Cincinnati reforms are unusual in their 
comprehensiveness, core elements of ongoing, transparent self-assessment 
are entering best-practice conventions.  The DOJ “Principles for Promoting 
Police Integrity” – a starting point for remedial design in many 
interventions – demand an open-ended inquiry into the underlying causes of 
impermissible behavior by prescribing that the “precipitating events” that 
led to the use of force, searches and seizures and other such actions should 
be reviewed to determine “whether any revisions to training or practices are 
necessary."
123
 The Early Intervention systems, which operate on the SARA 
principles at the core of POP, have enlarged their focus from (groups of) at 
risk officers to breakdowns in supervision that tolerate or encourage 
misconduct.  From there it is a manageable step to consideration of the 
strategies that shape the tasks and incentives of supervisors.  Cincinnati 
gives an imperfect but suggestive illustration of what it would mean to 
apply such assessment, not just in reaction to instances of malfeasance, but 
proactively to the agency’s core crime-control strategies. 
                                                 
123
  DOJ, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity, cited at 7. 
